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THE EFFECT OF PENNSYLVANIA'S COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE ON TRADITIONAL
TORT CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES
WALTER J. TIMBY, JR.f
MICHAEL J. PLEVYAKtI
I. INTRODUCTION: "FURNISHING THE SCALES TO
WEIGH WRONGDOING"
It is an incontestable principle that where the injury com-
plained of is the product of mutual or concurring negligence, no
action for damages will lie. The parties being mutually at fault,
there can be no apportionment of the damages. The law has no
scales to determine in such cases whose wrong-doing weighed most
in the compound that occasioned the mischief.'
A S IF TO RESPOND, however belatedly, to this quotation by
former Justice Woodward of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
the scales to determine wrongdoing* were furnished by the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature some 121 years later when that body, during its
160th session, enacted a statute establishing the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence in actions for injuries due to negligence. 2 With the
implementation of the Act, Pennsylvania has joined the ever increas-
ing majority of jurisdictions which have adopted some system of com-
paring negligence or fault in tort claim actions. 3
f Partner, LaBrum and Doak, Phiadelphia, Pennsylvania. B.S., Joseph's College, 1949;
LL.B., Temple University School of Law, 1960. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
f Associate, Malcolm & Riley, West Chester, Pennsylvania. B.S., West Chester State
College, 1968; J.D., Temple University School of Law, 1977. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1. Railroad v. Norton, 24 Pa. 465, 469 (1855).
2. For purposes of this symposium, references to and quotations from the Pennsylvania
Comparative Negligence Act will be made without citation. For the text of the Act, see Spina,
Introduction, Symposium: Comparative Negligence in Pennsylvania, 24 VILL. L. REV. 419,
419 (1979).
3. The frequency with which jurisdictions are adopting comparative negligence or compara-
tive fault makes any attempt at a complete listing difficult. At the time of printing, the authors
were aware of 33 jurisdictions in which, in one form or another, a general comparative negli-
gence or comparative fault system of apportioning damages is in force. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d
1037 (Alas. 1975) (judicially adopted); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (judicially adopted); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (judi-
cially adopted); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, - Mich. -, 375 N.W.2d 511 (1979)
(judicially adopted); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1978); GA.
CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1975); IDAliO CODE §§ 6-801
to -806 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a to -258b (1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14
§ 156 (Supp. 1978-1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES
(453)
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The effect of the Act can scarcely be overestimated. Indeed, this
symposium merely suggests the Act's wide-ranging impact, the
parameters of which, like its predecessor, traditional contributory
negligence, will be defined only after years of litigation, and probably
redefined as social policy or underlying policy considerations change.
The Act expressly changes long established doctrines of recovery and
revamps the method of recovery where a plaintiff's negligence
contributes causally to the occurrence of the accident which brought
about his injuries. 4  It also modifies the method of recovery against
and among joint tortfeasors. 5
ANN. § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1977); Act of Apr. 5, 1978, Legis. Bill No. 665, § 6, 1978 Neb. Laws
565 (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp.
1978-1979); N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAW §§ 1411-1413 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07
(1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1978-1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.470-.510
(1977); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (Supp. 1978); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp.
1978-1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.010-.910 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West
Supp. 1978-1979); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
The federal government has long had a comparative negligence rule under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-55 (1970), and the Merchant Marine Act of 1920
(Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), which incorporates the provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act in actions for personal injury or death of seamen, id.
4. It should be noted that the Act does not abrogate the formally recognized common law
contributory negligence defense, but merely modifies it. Under the newly adopted comparative
negligence concept, a plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery only when his con-
tributory negligence is greater than that "of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery
is sought." Where a plaintiff's contributory negligence is "not greater than" the causal negli-
gence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, he is allowed to recover,
but his total damages are diminished in proportion to his contributory negligence.
The basic operation of the Act can be demonstrated by the following example: Plaintiff is
involved in an automobile accident with defendant. The jury finds that plaintiff's total damages
were $10,000 and assesses plaintiff's contributory negligence at 20% and defendant's causal neg-
ligence at 80%. Plaintiff would be allowed to recover, but his total damages of $10,000 would be
reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence, 20%, resulting in a net verdict in his favor
of $8,000. If, conversely, plaintiff's contributory negligence were assessed at 80% and defen-
dant's causal negligence at 20%, the plaintiff would be totally barred from recovery. The im-
plementation of the doctrine in a situation with one plaintiff and one defendant is relatively
simple. Additional plaintiffs or defendants in the action, however, vastly compound this rather
simple functioning of the statute. Dealing with the application of the Act in multiple party
actions would require a single article or more. The authors, therefore, leave to others the task
of dealing with this complicated application. For a discussion by one of the authors, see Timby,
Comparative Negligence, 48 PA. B.A.Q. 219 (1977).
5. There seems to be little doubt that the Act modifies the common law concept of joint
and several liability in cases to which it applies. Under the traditional common law doctrine of
joint and several liability, if two or more tortfeasors are found jointly liable to the injured party,
each is responsible for the full extent of the damages inflicted. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 47, at 296 (4th ed. 1971). This was the law in Pennsylvania before the Act. Menarde v.
Pennsylvania Transp. Co., 376 Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954); Gorman v. Charlson, 287 Pa. 410,
135 A. 250 (1926). The second section of the new Act, however, appears to abolish this common
law doctrine by limiting each defendant's liability to "that proportion of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal
negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed." Under this provision,
a tortfeasor is liable only for his proprotionate share of the damages, not the entire amount. One
commentator has already remarked that this identical statutory language in New Hampshire,
2
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The impact of the Act is not to be measured solely by its express
provisions. Indeed, what the Act does not say will generate far
greater ramifications in tort law. The Act compels a reevaluation of
both traditional tort concepts and procedural applications in order to
adjust Pennsylvania tort law to accommodate the new statutory appor-
tionment doctrine.
The introduction of comparative negligence in Pennsylvania
raises a multitude of issues which the authors will leave to others,
including the task of interpreting and assessing the impact of the stat-
ute on multiple defendant situations,6 multiple plaintiff situations, 7
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977), and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036
(1973), call be construed to completely abolish joint and several liability in comparative negli-
gence cases. V. SCHWAIATZ, COMPARATIVE NECLIGNCE § 3.5(C), at 80-81, § 16.7, at 264
(1974).
The Act also changes the meaning ascribed to the phrase "pro rata" as used in the Pennsyl-
vania Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 8321-8327 (1978).
The phrase was previously construed as an intendment to codify the common law equal respon-
sibility of joint tortfeasors. Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959); Mong v. Hersh-
berger, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962). Under the Act, "pro rata" will mean
proportionate, rather than equal. Proportionate, for purposes of comparative negligence cases, is
defined in § (b) of the Act as "the ratio of the amount of ... [the individual tortfeasor's] causal
negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recov-
ery is allowed." See generally Timby, supra note 4, at 232.
6. This is a complex and confusing area of application. Most notable among the many issues
are the following:
(1) Who is to be considered a "defendant" for purposes of apportioning liability and dam-
ages Linder the Act? What happens in a situation where one or more of the tortfeasors are not
parties to the action or are shielded from liability? Section (a) of the Act provides that the
plaintiff's negligence will be compared to the negligence of the defendant or defendants "against
whom recovery is sought." The identical language in the Wisconsin statute, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979), has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to
include absent tortfeasors, settled parties, and persons otherwise barred from liability to the
plaintiff. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963); Walker v. Kroger Gro-
cery & Baking Co., 214 \Vis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934). Florida has taken an opposite approach
by holding that it is improper to apportion negligence to joint tortfeasors or to "phantom"
tortfeasors who are not before the court. Model v. Rabinowitz, 313 So.2d 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975); Souto v. Seagal, 302 So.2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
(2) Is the plaintiff's contributory negligence to be compared to the aggregate negligence of
the defendants or to the individual negligence of each defendant? The manner of comparison
can have vastly different results. Georgia, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have adopted a rule
against combining the negligence of defendants by construing their respective statutes to bar
recovery by a plaintiff from a joint defendant if the plaintiff would have been barred by his
contributory negligence from recovering in an action against that defendant alone. See Mishoe
v. Davis, 64 Ga. App. 700, 14 S.E.2d 187 (1941); Kowalske v. Armour & Co., 300 Minn. 301,
220 N.W.2d 268 (1974); Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721
(1934). At least one jurisdiction has refused to follow the rule against combining negligence. See
Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 82, 356 S.W.2d 20 (1962). An analysis of this issue necessarily involves
consideration of the statutory language implemented.
(3) The Act expressly provides for new rules of contribution among joint tortfeasors. See
note 5 supra. On the other hand, the Act is silent as to indemnitv. One must thus ask what
application, if any, the Act will have to the common law principles of indemnity. At least one
jurisdiction has abrogated the doctrine in the face of its comparative negligence statute. Gies v.
Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 204 N.W.2d 519 (1973); Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transp. Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 202 N.W.2d 268 (1972).
For a discussion of' these issues, see Timby, supra note 4, at 229-34.
7. Although the Act uses both the singular and plural form when referring to defendants, it
3
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derivative actions,8 counterclaims and set-offs, 9 and the multitude of
procedural considerations.10 The major purpose of this article is to
explore the impact of the statute on traditional tort actions and claims
arising out of' intentional tortious conduct, wanton and reckless mis-
conduct, and strict tort liability. This article will also examine the
Act's effect on the traditional tort doctrines of assumption of the risk
and "discovered peril."
Before dealing with these specific issues, it is necessary to briefly
examine the origins of the Pennsylvania comparative negligence con-
cept and some of the general principles by which it should be con-
strued and applied.
II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION
A. Origins
Although some commentators" have traced the origin of con-
tributory negligence in Pennsylvania to the case of Railroad Co. v.
Aspell, 12 the authors' research has revealed that the principle was
only uses the singular form "plaintiff." It is unclear how the Act will be applied in a multiple
plaintiff situation where one or both of the plaintiffs are contributorily negligent.
8. This issue is related to considerations of the Act's application in a multiple plaintiff
situation. More particularly, the question becomes whether the contributory negligence of an
injured plaintiff should diminish the innocent plaintiff's derivative recovery. The Washington
comparative negligence statute. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.010-910 (Supp. 1977), pre-
cludes imputed negligence between husband and wife so as to bar recovery in an action by the
innocent spouse. Id. § 4.22.020. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has developed formulae for
application to derivative claims where one or both of the claimants are contributorily negligent.
See Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 336, 234 N.W.2d 332 (1975);
White v. Lunder, 66 Wis. 2d 563, 225 N.W.2d 442 (1975).
9. These issues are necessarily tied to considerations of the Act's interpretation and applica-
tion in multiple defendant and multiple plaintiff situations. See generally Timby, supra note 4,
at 235-37.
10. For example, can the court, in a comparative negligence situation, declare contributory
negligence as a matter of law? Should special verdicts be employed in comparative negligence
cases? How should the jury be charged and to what extent should they be informed of the effect
of their verdict, particularly if special verdicts are employed? For a discussion of these issues,
see id. at 237-39.
11. See, e.g., M. MEYER, 2 LAW OF VEHICLE NEGLIGENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 18.00, at 3
(1970); Philbrick, Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases, Part II: Some Proposals for Reform
in Pennsylvania, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 766, 773 (1951).
12. 23 Pa. 147 (1854). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
It has been a rule of law from time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in all
time to come, that there can be no recovery for an injury caused by the mutual default of
both parties. When it can be shown that it would not have happened, except for the
culpable negligence of the party injured concurring with that of the other party, no action
can be maintained.
Id. at 149-50.
[VOL. 24: p. 453
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enunciated in Pennsylvania as early as 1840, in Simpson v. Hand. 13
Whatever its origins, it appears that contributory negligence was in-
troduced into Pennsylvania jurisprudence on the assumption that it
was so well established in the law that no further discussion was re-
quired. 14 The concept of contributory negligence which was eventu-
ally adopted in Pennsylvania was the principle announced in the En-
glish case of Butterfield v. Forrester.15 As more recently applied,
the doctrine has operated to prevent a plaintiff from recovery "if his
own negligence, however slight, contributes to the happening of the
accident in a proximate way." 16
Although the Pennsylvania courts have appeared to temper the
harsh doctrine of contributory negligence by creating the related doc-
trines of willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct 17 and discovered
peril,' 8 and by upholding the jury's right to render a compromise
verdict,' 9 the courts have, continually refused to implement a system
of comparative negligence or comparative fault to ameliorate the ef-
fects of the doctrine. 20  The courts have at times adhered so rigidly
13. 6 Whart. 311 (Pa. 1840). In Simpson, a negligence case involving the collision of ships,
the court enunciated the following rule: "It is an undoubted rule, that, for a loss from mutual
negligence, neither party can recover in a court of common law .... Id. at 321, citing Hill v.
Warren, 2 Stark. 377, 171 Eng. Rep. 678 (K.B. 1818). This principle was applied in a more
traditional tort context in Wynn v. Allard, 5 Watts & Serg. 524 (Pa. 1843). In Wynn, the court
stated that "[t]he principle that there is no recourse by action for an injury which is the con-
sequence of negligence on both sides, was laid down by this court in . . . [Simpson]." Id. at
524-25.
14. See notes 12 & 13 supra.
15. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). This case has been acknowledged as the
earliest contributory negligence case. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 65, at 416 n.1. Prosser also
notes that the first American case employing contributory negligence appears to have been the
Massachusetts case of Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick,) 621 (1824). W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§ 65, at 416 n.1.
16. McCay v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 447 Pa. 490, 495, 291 A.2d 759, 762 (1972).
17. See notes 56-77 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 182-86 and accompanying text infra.
19. Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227, 114 A.2d 150 (1955). In Karcesky, Justice Bell stated:
The doctrine of comparative negligence, or degrees of negligence, is not recognized
by the Courts of Pennsylvania, but as a practical matter they are frequently taken into
consideration by a jury. The net result, as every trial judge knows, is that in a large
majority of negligence cases where the evidence of negligence is not clear, or where the
question of contributory negligence is not free from doubt, the jury brings in a com-
promise verdict . . . Under such circumstances, a jury usually does what this jury did,
namely, render a compromise verdict which is much smaller in amount than they would
have awarded (a) if defendant's negligence was clear, and (b) if they were convinced that
plaintiffs were free from contributory negligence.
Where the evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, or both, is conflicting
or not free from doubt, a trial judge has the power to uphold the time-honored right of a
jury to render a compromise verdict, and to sustain a verdict which is substantial ....
Id. at 234-35, 114 A.2d at 154.
20. See Stiles v. Geesey, 71 Pa. 439 (1872). In Stiles, the supreme court stated:
The question presented to the court or the jury is never one of comparative negli-
gence, as between the parties; nor does very great negligence on the part of a defendant,
5
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to the contributory negligence doctrine that judgments have been re-
versed because the word "material" was used to qualify the degree of
the plaintiff's contributory negligence. 21 The judicial reluctance to
apply comparative fault in tort actions was in fact reaffirmed within
one year from the date of enactment of the Act. 22
It is difficult to ascribe any motivation to the unwillingness of the
judiciary to adopt a system of comparative negligence. 23  No great
significance should be attached to the judicial restraint, however,
since all jurisdictions which had adopted comparative negligence be-
fore 1973 had done so by legislative enactment.2 4  Whatever the
reasons for their inaction, the Pennsylvania courts had deferred to the
legislature for adoption of a comparative fault system and the legisla-
ture has recently furnished the vehicle for implementation of appor-
tioning fault in tort cases.
so operate to strike a balance of negligence as to give a judgment to a plaintiff whose own
negligence contributes in any degree to the injury ....
Id. at 442, quoting Wilds v. Hudson River R.R., 24 N.Y. 430, 432 (1862).
In Weir v. Haverford Elec. Light Co., 221 Pa. 611, 70 A. 874 (1908), the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania reiterated that "[t]he doctrine of comparative negligence has not been recog-
nized in our state. Any negligence on the part of a plaintiff that contributes to, and is the
proximate cause of, his injury defeats his action. There can be no balancing or matching of
degrees of negligence." Id. at 617, 70 A. at 876. The Weir rule has been more recently applied
in Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943), and in Cebulskie v. Lehigh Valley
R.R., 441 Pa. 230, 272 A.2d 171 (1971).
21. See Mattimore v. City of Erie, 144 Pa. 14, 22 A. 817 (1891); Oil City Fuel Supply Co.
v. Bound, 122 Pa. 449, 15 A. 865 (1888); Monongahela City v. Fischer, 111 Pa. 9, 2 A. 87
(1886).
22. See McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975). In
McCown, the court was asked to adopt a system whereby the plaintiff's contributory negligence
would be a factor in determining the plaintiff's recovery against the defendant in a strict tort
liability action under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 463 Pa. at 15, 342
A.2d at 382. Speaking for the court, former Chief Justice Jones stated:
Acceptance of the appellant's first alternative would create a system of comparative
assessment of damages for 402A actions. Neither the General Assembly by statute nor this
Court by case law has established such a scheme of comparative negligence in other areas
of tort law. Without considering the relative merits of comparative negligence, we think it
unwise to embrace the theory in the context of an appeal involving Section 402A.
Id. at 16, 342 A.2d at 382 (footnote omitted). The McCown court's reluctance to consider the
merits of comparative negligence may have been prompted by more than its reluctance to adopt
comparative negligence in Pennsylvania. As Chief Justice Jones explained in a footnote, "[to
initially apply a theory of comparative negligence to an area of the law in which liability is not
premised on negligence seems particularly inappropriate." Id.at n.3.
23. For what research reveals to be the sole case in which a Pennsylvania appellate court
has grounded its decision on deference to the legislature, see McCown v. International Har-
vester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 16, 342 A.2d 381, 382 (1975). For a discussion of McCown, see note 22
supra.
In the final analysis, Pennsylvania state courts may have rigidly applied contributory negli-
gence simply because it was well established by doctrinal precedents and, in most instances,
they were compelled to do so by virtue of stare decisis.
24. Florida was the first jurisdiction to judicially adopt comparative negligence. See Hoffman
v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). Since 1973, only three other jurisdictions, Alaska, Califor-
nia, and Michigan; have judicially adopted a comparative fault system. See Kaatz v. State, 540
P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P. 2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1975); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, - Mich. __ , 375 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
6
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This summary of the background of contributory and comparative
negligence in Pennsylvania has been provided only to emphasize that
the legislature has defined the nature of comparative fault to be
applied and has explicitly delineated the extent of that doctrine. Due
respect should therefore be accorded to the legislature's handiwork.
As previously stated, numerous adjustments are needed to con-
form Pennsylvania's tort law to the apportionment system adopted by
the legislature. The fact that Pennsylvania courts will now apportion
damages in tort actions does not support the proposition that the
courts will do so in all situations, regardless of the extent of fault.
Rather, the apportionment system adopted by the legislature retains
the basic fault concept that one should not be allowed to recover
against others who are less culpable.25
B. The Wisconsin Model
The proliferation of legislation and judicial action in the field of
comparative negligence has resulted in almost as many different ap-
proaches as there are jurisdictions which have adopted the concept.
Although many jurisdictions have followed others in developing its
own comparative negligence doctrines, every jurisdiction seems to
have retained a certain individual element which makes its doctrine
somewhat unique.26 The Pennsylvania statute is no different. Al-
though borrowing principally from the basic approach of Wisconsin, 27
the Pennsylvania legislature nonetheless has fashioned a truly unique
comparative negligence statute.
Despite the manifold fine differences among the various jurisdic-
tions which have adopted comparative negligence laws, all of the
unique applications have emanated from one of three elemental ap-
proaches. In understanding what Pennsylvania comparative negli-
gence is, it is thus important to know what it is not.
25. This system should be contrasted with "pure" comparative negligence, in which the
plaintiff is allowed to recover regardless of the extent of his fault. His recovery, however, will
be diminished accordingly. For a discussion of "pure" comparative negligence, see text accom-
panying notes 28-31 infra.
26. Although each jurisdiction may be attempting to fashion a concept uniquely palatable to
its ideas of equity and fairness, the few cases of duplication certainly indicate that no one
jurisdiction has developed a system or statute so well-worded or applied that it has been ac-
cepted with any unanimity. The lesson to be learned may be that although newly emerging
comparative negligence states are not sure of what they want, they obviously are sure of what
they do not want.
27. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979). For a discussion of the legisla-
tive history of the Act with relation to the Wisconsin model, see notes 41-45 and accompanying
text infra.
1978-1979]
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"Pure" comparative negligence always permits a plaintiff to re-
cover regardless of the percentage of his negligence so long as his
negligence was not the sole cause of the accident causing his in-
juries. 28 His recovery is reduced, however, by diminishing his total
damages in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
him. 29 This sytem of comparative negligence has been adopted for
general application in at least seven jurisdictions30 and appears in
many limited statutes applicable to damage caused by railroads or to
injuries sustained by employees in certain, employment situations. 31
Unlike the "pure" system, the "50%" comparative negligence
system allows a plaintiff to recover only when his contributory negli-
gence is equal to or less than that of the defendant or defendants. 3 2
This approach retains more of the traditional contributory negligence
rationale by prohibiting a plaintiff from recovering from one who is
less negligent than himself. 33  The "50%" comparative negligence
approach has two basic variations. The original and majority version is
exemplified by those statutes which provide that a plaintiff is not
barred from recovery when his negligence is "less than" or "not as
great as" the negligence of the defendant or defendants.3 4  The sec-
ond version usually provides, as in the Pennsylvania Act, that a plain-
tiff's contributory negligence will not bar recovery if it is "not greater
than" the defendant's or defendants' negligence.35 The significant
28. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 3.2, at 46.
29. Id.
30. Pure comparative negligence exists in Alaska, California, Florida, Mississippi, New
York, Rhode Island, and Washington. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.
2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Miss. Cor, ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 1411-1413
(McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAVS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
88 4.22.010-.22.910 (Supp. 1977).
31. For a listing of comparative negligence statutes of limited application, see V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 387 app.
32. See id. § 2.1, at 33.
33. Id.
34. This system is currently in force in Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Wyo-
ming. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Snpp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973
& Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-801 to -806 (Supp.
1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a to -2581) (1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp.
1978-1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
604.01 (West Snpp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1978-1979); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 18.470-.510 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (1977); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
35. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 33. This formula has been adopted in Con-
necticut, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1978); MONT. RE'. CODES ANN. § 58-607.1 (Supp. 1977);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977); TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); Wis.
460 [VOL. 24: p. 453
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difference between these two approaches occurs in a situation where
a jury assesses the plaintiff's and defendant's negligence as equal.
Under those circumstances, the plaintiff would not recover under the
former version, but would recover under the latter. These two 50%
systems are the most widely adopted method of apportioning liability.
The final type of comparative negligence statute is the "slight-
gross" system of comparing negligence. Under this formulation, the
plaintiff is allowed to recover when his negligence is slight and the
defendant's negligence is gross by comparison. 3 6  Similar to the
"50%" systems, a plaintiff's damages, in the event of recovery, are
mitigated in proportion to his contributory negligence. 37  This ap-
proach has very limited acceptance, having been adopted in only two
jurisdictions. 11
As between plaintiffs and defendants, the Pennsylvania Act is
clearly one of the "50%" comparative negligence systems, allowing
recovery only if the claimant's negligence is equal to or less than
50%. When determining the amount of recovery between or among
defendants, however, the contribution provisions of the statute oper-
ate more in the nature of a "pure" comparative negligence system,
allowing recovery regardless of the relative proportions of negli-
gence. 39 This blend of comparative negligence systems is not unique
to Pennsylvania. 40 The Pennsylvania courts thus have the opportu-
nity to draw from the experience of other jurisdictions when imple-
menting the procedures mandated by the Act.
Wisconsin has been identified as the forerunner among those
states which have adopted general comparative negligence statues. 41
It has had a "50%" comparative negligence statute since 193 142 and
there have been many judicial decisions implementing and construing
STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1978-1979) (amending WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1966)
("not as great as")).
36. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 33.
37. Id.
38. This formula has been adopted in Nebraska and South Dakota. Act of Apr. 5, 1978,
Legis. Bill No. 665, § 6, 1978 Neb. Laws 565 (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151),
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1967).
39. Section (b) provides that "[a]ny defendant who is ... compelled to pay more than his
percentage share may seek contribution." This right of recovery is operative regardless of the
percentage of causal negligence of the defendant seeking a contribution recovery.
40. See, e.g., Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971); Bielski v. Schulze, 60 Wis. 2d
1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
41. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 33, § 3.5, at 74-75.
42. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1966) (amended 1971). The original Wisconsin statute
was amended in 1971, changing the phrase "not as great as" to "not greater than." Act of June
22, 1971, ch. 47, 1971 Wis. Laws 50. As it presently reads, the statute allows a plaintiff who is
found equally negligent with a defendant to recover. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp.
1978-1979).
1978-1979]
9
Timby and Plevyak: The Effect of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute on Tr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the language of the statute and the purposes of its enactment. 43  As
the "50%" form of comparative negligence has become the most pre-
valent, the experience of these other states has created a large base of
precedent for newly developing "50%" jurisdictions.
The rather limited legislative. history of Pennsylvania's compara-
tive negligence statute indicates that Pennsylvania has also decided to
use Wisconsin as its model. Senator Henry G. Hager, one of the
principal sponsors of the legislation, stated during a Senate floor de-
bate on an amendment offered to his bill that the "bill comes almost
exclusively from the Wisconsin statute .. . . It has worked very well
in Wisconsin and it is my understanding and my hope that in Penn-
sylvania it will work the same way." 44  Although Senator Hager's
remarks are a forceful indication that Pennsylvania's comparative
negligence doctrine should develop as comparative negligence has
developed in Wisconsin, the legislative intent is unclear. Not-
withstanding Senator Hager's statement, the statute does not appear
to have come "almost exclusively from the Wisconsin statute." 45 It
is nonetheless submitted that Senator Hager's remarks are significant
in establishing that the sponsors of the law had the Wisconsin enact-
ment in mind when they formulated Pennsylvania's version.
Similarities in language and purpose should therefore be given effect
and, in such circumstances, the Pennsylvania approach should be
modeled on that implemented in Wisconsin.
C. Applying Authority From Other Jurisdictions
We have already mentioned the multitude of different ap-
proaches utilized by the various jurisdictions in implementing an ap-
portionment system. 46 This should serve as a caveat to one who
43. See, e.g., cases cited note 6 supra.
44. 1 PA. LEG. J. 1707 (Senate 1976) (remarks of Sen. Hager). The remarks of Senator Hager
were made during discussion of Senator Hill's proposed amendment to Pennsylvania Senate Bill
1237, which was designed to deny recovery to a plaintiff whose contributory negligence was
equal to the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants and to' provide for a special
verdict procedure. For a discussion of the Hill Amendment, see text accompanying notes 196-
201 infra.
45. Although portions of the first section of the Pennsylvania Act are similar to the Wiscon-
sin statute, other portions differ considerably. The entire second section of the Pennsylvania Act
has no counterpart in the Wisconsin enactment. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102
(Purdon 1978) with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979). The Pennsylvania Act
appears to implement by legislation what Wisconsin has employed judicially. See note 40 and
accompanying text supra. The first sentence of § (b) of the Act is identical to one of the sen-
tences in the New Hampshire and Vermont statutes. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a
(Supp. 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973). A similar sentence also appears in the
Kansas statute. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1976). The second paragraph of § (b) is
similar to a provision in the New Jersey statute. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West Supp.
1978-1979).
46. See notes 28-38 and accompanying text supra.
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searches for authority from other jurisdictions which may be applica-
ble to Pennsylvania's experience with comparative negligence. The
diversity of approaches, statutes, and judicial applications will provide
an advocate with a myriad of precedents from which to draw support.
Jurists and advocates alike should therefore be certain that the au-
thority cited is reasonably applicable to the Pennsylvania comparative
negligence situation.
The authors suggest four basic considerations which should be
applied in determining the validity of authority: (1) the type of coin-
parative negligence system adopted; 47 (2) the manner in which the
comparative negligence or fault system was adopted; 48 (3) the similar-
ity or difference in language in the comparative negligence statute; 49
and (4) the status and application of tort concepts within the jurisdic-
tion prior to adoption of comparative negligence or comparative
fault. 50 Using these considerations as a guide and starting point, it
should be possible to isolate those precedents in other jurisdictions
which are appropriate to identify the decisions which comport with
the intent and spirit of the Pennsylvania comparative negligence
statute.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ACT TO RECOGNIZED
TORT ACTIONS AND CLAIMS
When a comparative negligence statute is first enacted, questions
arise as to whether the statute applies to claims on a liability theory
other than common law negligence. 51 It would appear that the Act
47. It should be reiterated that Pennsylvania's comparative negligence system is not a
"pure" system, except to the extent of contribution among joint tortfeasors. See notes 28-31 &
39 and accompanying text supra. The Pennsylvania system retains fault to the extent that the
plaintiff is barred from recovering when his negligence exceeds that of the defendant or defen-
dants. It is suggested that authority from "pure" jurisdictions be carefully applied in Pennsyl-
vania.
48. The crucial distinction is whether the system was adopted by legislative enactment or by
the judiciary. When the concept is adopted judicially, the comparative system is to be applied
to all tort actions, claims, and doctrines which are conducive to apportionment. It is submitted
that a jurisdiction is in a completely different analytical situation when the legislature has cir-
cumscribed the parameters of the doctrine's effect.
49. For a discussion of the similarity of Pennsylvania's statute to statutes in other jurisdic-
tions, see note 45 supra. Cases construing similar language in these identified jurisdictions will
be persuasive in Pennsylvania.
50. Some tort doctrines are labelled differently in different jurisdictions. Additionally, other
tort doctrines, though carrying the same name, may have two distinct meanings in two separate
jurisdictions. For an example of this situation, see notes 161-79 and accompanying text infra. To
insure an accurate evaluation, the origin and application of the underlying tort doctrines must
therefore be compared.
51. See, e.g., Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d 85, 142 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1977) (comparative
negligence not applicable in cases of intentional wrongdoing); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc.,
Minn. -, 262 N.W.2d 377 (1977) (comparative negligence applicable to product liability ac-
tion based upon strict liability in tort).
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by its express terms has foreclosed any argument in this area since
section (a) provides that the Act will apply only to "actions brought to
recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person
or property." In spite of similar limitations in the statutes of other
jurisdictions, courts have construed their comparative negligence
statutes to apply to other than common law negligence actions and
claims. 52 Regardless of the restrictive language in the Act, it should
also be noted that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania retains the
prerogative to judicially modify the common law to bring other tort
actions and claims into conformity with the comparative principles
which will be applied in common law negligence actions.
We now turn to an examination of the anticipated impact of the
Comparative Negligence Act upon three other bases of liability in
tort: intentional torts; Willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct; and
strict liability.
A. Intentional Torts
In Pennsylvania, as in all other jurisdictions, contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to an action for an intentional tort. 5 3 It is
submitted that this rule should be maintained and the Act should not
be extended to-include intentional torts. When a party actually in-
tends to inflict harm upon the plaintiff, the plaintiff's inattentiveness
should be irrelevant. Moreover, any conduct on the part of the plain-
tiff, though denominated contributory negligence, which is of such a
consequence as to be compared with the intentional action of the
defendant, is more likely to be in the nature of one of the common
law defenses to intentional torts, such as consent, self-defense, or de-
fense of others.
The few jurisdictions which have dealt specifically with this issue
tinder a comparative negligence doctrine have been unanimous in rul-
ing that comparative negligence has no application where the defend-
ant's conduct consists of intentional or deliberate wrongdoing. 54 The
same rule should be followed in Pennsylvania.
52. See, e.g., Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., __ Minn. __ , 262 N.W.2d 377 (1977) (com-
parative negligence applied to strict liability theory); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967) (same).
53. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 202, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943); Bauchspies v. Obert,
51 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 445 (1912). Dean Prosser has in fact noted that the defense of contribu-
tory negligence has never been extended to intentional torts. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 65,
at 426.
54. See Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d 85, 142 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1977); Stephan v. Lynch,
__ Vt. -, 388 A.2d 376 (1978); Schulze v. Cleever, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560
(1960).
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B. Willful, Wanton, or Reckless Misconduct
More difficulty is encountered with the application of the con-
cept of willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct than with the applica-
tion of intentional wrongdoing in a comparative negligence system.
Rather extensive analyses by the Pennsylvania appellate courts have
seemingly placed this concept between that which is generally recog-
nized as common law negligence and that form of deliberate conduct
which is generally labelled an intentional tort. 55 The concept of
some form of culpability between intent and negligence has been de-
fined and applied in Pennsylvania under a variety of terms, including
"willful," "wanton," and "reckless."56 Moreover, the Pennsylvania
courts have strained to further define this gradation into three levels
of culpability which are apparently distinguishable from one
another. 57 Whatever the rubric applied, all three forms of this gra-
dation operate to negate a plaintiff's contributory negligence and thus
permit recovery. 58
The notion of culpability which is greater than negligence and
less than intentional conduct appears to have been introduced into
Pennsylvania jurisprudence in the case of Gillespie v. McGowan.5 9
The rule was expanded and eventually applied to allow recovery in a
series of situations where the plaintiff, because of some legal hand-
icap, such as contributory negligence, would not otherwise be al-
lowed to recover. The most notable of these situations is illustrated
by cases in which the plaintiff was a trespasser or an uninvited party
on a railroad or subway right of way, 60 an infant trespasser on a train
55. See Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943). The Kasanovich court
stated:
It must be understood, of course, that wanton misconduct is something different from
negligence however gross-different not merely in degree but in kind, and evincing a
different state of mind on the part of the tortfeasor. Negligence consists of inattention or
inadvertence, whereas wantonness exists where the danger to the plaintiff, though
realized, is so recklessly disregarded that, even though there be no actual intent, there is
at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration of the
wrong.
Id. at 203, 34 A.2d at 525.
56. See note 65 infra.
57. See note 66 infra.
58. See, e.g., Fugagli v. Camasi, 426 Pa. 1, 229 A.2d 735 (1967) (wanton misconduct); Mis-
orski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 204, 34 A.2d 526 (1943) (reckless or wanton misconduct).
59. 100 Pa. 144 (1882). The Gillespie court stated that "[ilt is settled by abundant authority
that to enable a trespasser to recover for an injury he must do more than show negligence. It
must appear there was a wanton or intentional injury inflicted on him by the owner." Id. at
150.
60. See, e.g., Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965); Zawacki
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 374 Pa. 89, 97 A.2d 63 (1953); Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940); Peden v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 324 Pa. 444, 188 A. 586
(1936); Cover v. Hershey Transit Co., 290 Pa. 551, 139 A. 266 (1927).
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or wagon,61 a railroad passenger who had released the railroad from
liability for negligence, 62 or a person who was simply contributorily
negligent. 63  Whatever the application, the intent in each case
seemed to be to allow recovery to the plaintiff because the conduct of
the defendant was so culpable as to compel recovery regardless of the
plaintiff's legal impediment. 64
In its early application in Pennsylvania, the concept of culpability
between that of negligence and intentional conduct passed under sev-
eral names, many of which were used simultaneously and inter-
changeably. 65 Eventually, however, the new gradation of culpability
was further divided into the concepts of "willful," "wanton," and
"reckless." '66 As the meaning of these concepts evolved, "willful"
misconduct.came to be defined as something in the nature of an in-
tentional tort. 67  "Wanton" misconduct, on the other hand, was
applied in a situation where a defendant, having reason to know of
the plaintiff's peril, ignored the peril and proceeded in the face of
it. 68 Finally, "reckless" misconduct seems to have been applied only
61. Petrowski v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 263 Pa. 531, 107 A. 381 (1919); McGinnis v.
Peoples Bros., 249 Pa. 335, 94 A. 925 (1915).
62. Turek v. Pennsylvania R.R., 369 Pa. 341, 85 A.2d 845 (1952); Bowman v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 299 Pa. 558, 149 A. 877 (1930).
63. Millili v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 418 Pa. 154, 209 A.2d 817 (1965); Kasanovich v.
George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943).
64. See Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943). In Kasanovich, the court
reasoned that contributory negligence should not bar recovery where the defendant had exhib-
ited "at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious indifference to the perpetration of the
wrong." Id. at 203, 34 A.2d at 525.
65. Compare Petrowski v. Philadelphia & R. By., 263 Pa. 531, 107 A. 381 (1919) ("inten-
tional,'" "willful," and "wanton" used simultaneously and interchangeably to describe the doc-
trine) with Bowman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 299 Pa. 558, 149 A. 877 (1930) ("willful" and "wan-
ton" combined together in considering whether there was sufficient evidence in the lower court
of "willful, wanton, or gross negligence").
66. See Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965). The Evans
court reasoned:
Correctly speaking, wilful misconduct means that the actor desired to bring about the
result that followed, or at least that he was aware that it was substantially certain to
ensue. This, of course, would necessarily entail actual prior knowledge of the trespasser's
peril. Wanton misconduct, on the other hand, "means that the actor has intentionally
done an act of an unreasonable character, in disregard of a risk known to him or so
obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly
probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to
the consequences ... ..
Id. at 573-74, 212 A.2d at 443, quoting W. PROSSER, LAWe OF TORTS § 33, at 151 (2d ed. 1955).
See also Saaybe v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 F. Supp. 65, 69 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (all three
concepts defined).
67. See Bowman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 299 Pa. 558, 149 A. 877 (1930). The Bowman court
stated that "[t]o be wilful the harm must have been intentionally inflicted, and to be wanton
must have been committed with a reckless regard [sic) of the rights of others." Id. at 567, 149
A. at 880.
68. See Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965). For a discus-
sion of Evans, see note 66 supra; note 70 infra.
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in those cases in which the Pennsylvania appellate courts have dealt
with the "discovered peril" doctrine.6 9
Upon an examination of the cases which have attempted to dis-
tinguish "willful" and "wanton" misconduct, one readily observes the
courts' attempts to liberalize the application of" "wanton" misconduct
so as to allow a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover. Indeed,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, although mentioning the word
"reckless," appears to have been measuring the evidence of "wanton"
misconduct by the reasonable care standard of common law negli-
gence. 70
Another interesting observation in this area of tort law is the
similarity of the application of "willful" and "wanton" misconduct to
that of the "discovered peril" doctrine.71 The sharp line of distinc-
tion 72 between these concepts has essentially been inconsequential
since the application of either doctrine operates to negate the plain-
69. See text accompanying note 71 infra. For a discussion of the discovered peril doctrine,
see notes 182-95 and accompanying text infra.
70. See Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440 (1965). Regarding the
standard of knowledge needed to apply the doctrine, the supreme court stated:
These cases, as well as the Restatement of Torts, clearly indicate that if the actor ...at
least has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable man to realize the existing
peril for a sufficient period of time beforehand to give him a reasonable opportunity to
take means to avoid the accident, then he is guilty of wanton misconduct if he recklessly
disregards the existing danger.
Id. at 574, 212 A.2d at 444 (emphasis added). Although invoking the notion of "reckless disre-
gard" in the definition of duty, the Evans court implied that if the defendant had negligently
failed to realize the peril of the plaintiff and, further, was negligent in failing to avoid the
accident, he would have acted "wantonly." See id.
In Frederick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940), the court
stated that "it is wanton negligence, within the meaning of the law, to fail to use ordinary and
reasonable care to avoid injury to a trespasser after his presence has been ascertained." Id. at
140, 10 A.2d at 576 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
See also Petrowski v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 263 Pa. 531, 107 A. 381 (1919). The Petrowski
court stated: "Finally, where one, knowing that a child of tender years is trespassing upon a
vehicle under his care, negligently acts in such a manner as to injure the trespasser, the con-
duct of the transgressor is viewed in law as 'intentional,' or wilful, and 'wanton' . ... Id. at
536, 107 A. at 382 (emphasis added). For a review of authority in this area and a rather candid
analysis, see Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. at 581-96, 212 A.2d at 447-55 (Mus-
manno, J., dissenting).
71. For a discussion of the discovered peril doctrine, see notes 182-95 and accompanying
text infra.
72. The difficulty of defining the distinctions among common law negligence, "wanton" mis-
conduct, and the "discovered peril doctrine" is amply demonstrated by the case of Millili v.
Alan Wood Steel Co., 418 Pa. 154, 209 A.2d 817 (1965). Moreover, Dean Prosser has observed:
This "conscious last clear chance," sometimes distinguished as the "doctrine of discovered
peril," occasionally has been explained on the basis that negligence after the danger is
known to the defendant necessarily involves a greater degree of fault, and amounts to
"willful" or "wanton" misconduct, to which the ordinary negligence of the plaintiff is no
defense.
W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 66, at 429 (footnote omitted).
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tiff's contributory negligence. 73  The major difference between the
approaches is that in the application of "wanton" misconduct, the
focus is on culpability, whereas the application of the "discovered
peril" doctrine focuses on causation. 74  Whatever the focus, both doc-
trines allow a plaintiff to recover, regardless of his contributory negli-
gence, where it would otherwise be unjust to deny recovery.
Although the application of the concepts of "willful," "wanton,"
and "reckless" misconduct served a valid purpose in tempering the
harsh effects of contributory negligence when a defendant's conduct
was extremely culpable in comparison to the plaintiff's negligence,
the concepts have little, if any, purpose in a comparative negligence
system. The doctrines were simply attempts to apply a comparative
fault system in a traditional common law contributory negligence
jurisdiction. 75  Although Pennsylvania courts have endeavored to dis-
tinguish these concepts from ordinary negligence, 76 the attempts
must be recognized as merely a means of circumventing the con-
tributory negligence rule in situations where its application would
produce a manifestly unjust result. 7 7
Approaching the issue from another perspective, one might ask
the purpose to be served by retaining the wantonness or recklessness
concept in a comparative negligence situation. Since the purpose of
comparative negligence is to eliminate the "all-or-nothing" approach
to tort recovery, 78 there appears to be little justification for retaining
73. See cases cited note 58 supra. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 65, at 426, § 66, at
427.
74. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 66, at 429-30.
75. According to Dean Prosser, cases in which courts have held that ordinary negligence on
the part of a plaintiff will not bar recovery where the defendant's conduct was "willful," "wanton,"
or "reckless," form "in reality a rule of comparative fault . . . and the court is refusing to set up
the lesser fault against the greater." Id. § 66, at 426. See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5,
§ 5.1, at 99-100; F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 2 THE LAW OF' TORTS § 22.6, at 1215 (1956).
76. See notes 55 & 67 supra.
77. This motivation is probably best evident in the case of Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa.
199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, after having carefully
framed the concept of "wanton misconduct" in the area of culpability between intentional torts
and ordinary negligence, endeavored to rationalize that its action was not in contravention of
the rejection in Pennsylvania of comparative negligence. id. at 203, 34 A.2d at 525. The court
stated:
Negligence consists of inattention or inadvertence, whereas wantonness exists where the
danger to the plaintiff, though realized, is so recklessly disregarded that, even though
there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury, a conscious
indifference to the perpetration of the wrong. Having in mind this characterization of
wanton misconduct, it will be readily seen that the principle that contributory negligence
is not a defense to an action for a tort involving such misconduct is not in conflict with the
rejection in Pennsylvania of the doctrines of "comparative negligence" and "last clear
chance" hereinbefore referred to.
78. See I PA. LEG. J. 1705 (Senate 1976) (remarks of Sen. Kelley).
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the "all-or-nothing" approach in particular contexts. Although the
conduct of the defendants has been described as "wanton" or "reck-
less," it is submitted that it is simply a high degree or percentage of
ordinary negligence. 79 There apparently is no harm when such con-
duct is compared to that of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. If
the conduct of the defendant is in fact so culpable as to constitute
something more than negligence, it should reduce the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence by comparison and have little effect on the plain-
tiff's recovery. A countervailing consideration is that retention of a
separate gradation of culpability may encourage claimants to denomi-
nate the defendant's conduct as "willful," "wanton," or "reckless" in
order to circumvent application of the comparative negligence doc-
trine.
The majority of jurisdictions which have considered the impact of
comparative negligence on "wanton misconduct" or "gross" negli-
gence 8 0 have applied comparative negligence even where defend-
ant's conduct was "grossly" negligent, "reckless," or "wanton." 81
Only one, now repealed, comparative negligence statute has made
specific mention of "willful and wanton conduct." 82 Three jurisdic-
tions, however, have specifically included "gross negligence" in their
comparative negligence statutes. 8 3  The remaining statutes do not
expressly address the issue.
The absence of specific mention of "gross" negligence or "wanton
misconduct" has not foreclosed the application of comparative negli-
gence principles to these doctrines. Most notable among those cases
extending comparative negligence is the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin's decision in Bielski v. Schulze. 84  In Bielski, the court deter-
79. The authors wonder by what standard recklessness is to be measured if not by the
standard of reasonable care. One must then ask whether there is a standard of reckless care. If
so, one must further question whether the jury is to consider what a reckless person would do
under the circumstances.
80. These terms are used interchangeably in some jurisdictions. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16
Wis. 2d 1, 15-16, 114 N.W.2d 105, 112 (1962). Compare Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556
F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1977) (Oregon definition of "gross negligence") with Evans v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 574, 212 A.2d 440, 443 (1965) (definition of "wanton miscon-
duct").
81. See notes 85-98 and accompanying text infra.
82. Act of Mar. 12, 1973, No. 303, §§ 1-3, 1973 Ark. Acts 928 (repealed 1975). The statute
provided: "The word 'fault' as used in this Act includes negligence, willful and wanton miscon-
duct, supplying of a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous condition, or any other act
or admission or conduct actionable in tort." Id. The above section was later amended and now
provides: "The word 'fault' as used in this Act ... includes any act, omission, conduct, risk
assumed, breach of warranty or breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any
damages sustained by any party." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1763 (Supp. 1977).
83. See IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977).
84. 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
1978-19791
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mined that gross negligence, which encompasses willful and wanton
misconduct, generally constitutes a higher degree of negligence. 8 5
The court concluded that the doctrine of gross negligence should be
abolished since it was a vehicle of social policy which no longer ful-
filled a purpose under comparative negligence.86  A federal court ap-
plying the Arkansas comparative negligence statute reached a similar
result in Billingsley v. Westrac Co.87 Concerned that the Arkansas
statute 88 would be inapplicable whenever the defendant's conduct
was characterized as something other than negligence, the Billingsley
court construed the statute as applying to actions based upon a de-
fendant's willful and wanton misconduct. 89  This decision was appa-
rently endorsed by the Arkansas legislature when it subsequently
amended the Arkansas comparative negligence statute to define
"fault," rather than "negligence," as including "willful and wanton
conduct." 90
Moreover, Florida's comparative negligence system has also been
construed to apply to that area of culpability which falls between or-
85. Id. at 14-15, 114 N.W.2d at 112.
86. Id. at 14-19, 114 N.W.2d' at 111-14. The court stated:
One of the main reasons" for the growth of the doctrine of gross negligence was to
ameliorate the hardships of the common-law doctrine of contributory negligence which
barred recovery from a tort-feasor to one negligently causing, however slightly, his own
injury. However, gross negligence, being defined as different in kind and not in degree,
could not be compared to ordinary negligence and, hence, contributory negligence was no
bar to recovery. Various guest statutes couched in terms of wilfully, wantonly, and reck-
lessly, although not adopted in Wisconsin, also influenced the growth of the doctrine of
gross negligence to reach the socially desirable result. The hardship of the common-law
doctrine of barring recovery in cases involving ordinary negligence was recognized by the
passage of . . . [the Wisconsin comparative negligence law] in 1931, and the old principle
that a tort-feasor should not profit from his wrongdoing was modified by that section to
apply only when the contributory negligence was equal to or greater than the defendant's
negligence. This section was a limited recognition of the principle that the negligence or
tort-feasors causing an injury ought to be evaluated on a relative fault basis. This recogni-
tion is based on the truism that when one tort-feasor is prevented from profiting from his
own wrong, you necessarily allow the other tort-feasor, who is not compelled to pay, to
profit from his wrong.
The doctrine of gross negligence as a vehicle of social policy no longer fulfills a pur-
pose in comparative negligence. Much of what constituted gross negligence will be found
to constitute a high percentage of ordinary negligence causing the harm. Obviously, we
are stressing the basic goal of the law of negligence, the equitable distribution of the loss
in relation to the respective contribution of the faults causing it.
Id. at 16-17, 114 N.W.2d at 112-13 (footnotes omitted).
87. 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966).
88. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1-1730.2 (1962) (current version at ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977)). The statute construed by the Billingsley court applied to "all
actions hereafter accruing for negligence." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1730.2 (repealed 1973) (em-
phasis added).
89. 365 F.2d at 623.
90. Act of Mar. 12, 1973, No. 303, §§ 1-3, 1973 Ark. Acts 928 (1973) (repealed 1975). See
note 89 supra. The current definition of "fault" is even more liberal. See note 82 supra.
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dinary negligence and an intentional tort.91 In addition, although the
impact of California's comparative negligence system in this area has
not yet been directly addressed, the Supreme Court of California, in
judicially adopting the comparative negligence concept, noted "that a
comprehensive system of comparative negligence should allow for the
apportionment of damages in all cases involving misconduct which
falls short of being intentional." 92
The only state appellate court which has retained the common
law rule in the face of a comparative negligence statute is the
Superior Court of New Jersey, in Draney v. Bachmian. 93  The court
in Draney viewed willful, wanton, and reckless conduct as having
been "elevated to the status of a separate tort"94 which was not
amenable to apportionment." Although the court distinguished
"wanton misconduct" from negligence, it "recognized that there was
no simple formula that could describe with exactness the difference
between negligence and willful, and wanton misconduct."96 Using a
similar analysis, the Ninth Circuit has also refused to offset a defend-
ant's gross negligence with a plaintiff's contributory negligence de-
spite Oregon's comparative negligence statute. 97
Joining one of the noted commentators in this field, 98 the authors
suggest the elimination of the concept of willful, wanton, and reckless
misconduct with the adoption of comparative negligence in Pennsyl-
vania.
C. Strict Tort Liability
Strict tort liability is well established in Pennsylvania jurispru-
dence and has been applied to situations involving liability for ab-
91. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'r. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla.
1973) (applying Florida law). The court stated that where the plaintiff claims that the defendants
were grossly negligent, "the equitable cause is to allow plaintiff's negligence to diminish its
recovery of compensatory damages. If the defendants' negligence is truly 'gross', the plaintiff's
negligence will appear that much smaller in comparison." Id. at 38.
92. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
873 (1975) (citation omitted).
93. 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (Law Div. 1976).
94. Id. at 513, 351 A.2d at 414.
95. Id. at 513-14, 351 A.2d at 414-15.
96. Id. at 513, 351 A.2d at 414. The authors suggest that the Superior Court of New Jersey
has found a distinction without a difference.
97. Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460, 465 (9th Cir. 1977), construing OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 18.470-510 (1977).
98. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 5.3, at 108.
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normally dangerous activities," products liability, 100 and liability for
material misrepresentations in connection with the sale of a prod-
tuct.101 Although evidence of the ordinary negligence of a plaintiff
may be a relevant consideration in some strict tort liability situa-
tions, 102 Pennsylvania appellate courts have repeatedly rejected the
notion that a plaintiff's contributory negligence can be a defense in a
strict tort liability case. 103 One must therefore consider whether
99. Lobozzo v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 437 Pa. 360, 263 A.2d 432 (1970); Federoff v. Harri-
son Constr. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949). See also Mulchanock v. Whitehall Cement
Mfg. Co., 253 Pa. 262, 98 A. 554 (1916) (objects hurled upon plaintiff's property during blasting
operations actionable in trespass).
100. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965)).
101. Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 356, 367 A.2d 304 (1976)
(adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965)).
102. See McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 19-20, 342 A.2d 381, 384
(1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring). Justice Pomeroy stated:
This is not to say, however, that evidence of ordinary negligence on the part of a
plaintiff is never relevant in a Section 402A action; such evidence may bear directly upon
the determination of whether the plaintiff has proved all the elements necessary to make
out a cause of action. Thus, negligence in the use of a product may tend to show that the
plaintiff caused a defect and therefore that the product was not defective when sold ....
Again, if the negligent use of a product amounts to abnormal use, it may be inferred that
the product was not defective at all, for a product is not defective if it is safe for normal
handling and use . . . . Similarly, negligence in the use of a product may have a bearing -
on the question whether a defect in a product was the legal cause of the plaintiff's in-
jury ....
What has been said is not intended as an exhaustive listing of the purposes for which
evidence of the plaintiff's negligence may be relevant in Section 402A cases. It is in-
tended merely to indicate that, although such negligence is not per se a bar to recovery,
it may nevertheless have that effect in a proper case where it negates an essential element
of the cause of action.
Id. (citations omitted).
See also Seidelson, The 402A Defendant and the Negligent Actor, 15 DUQ. L. REv. 371
(1977). This commentator reasoned:
If a court decides, as I think it should, that contributory negligence is a defense not
available to the 402A defendant, the court must be continually sensitive to the necessity
for distinguishing between that offered evidence which indicates only contributory negli-
gence (and is therefbre inadmissible), and that evidence which, though implying fault,
may be admissible as tending to indicate either a legitimate liability-defeating fact, such as
a non-contemplatable misuse of a' product which although defective is not unreasonably
dangerous, or a matter affecting creditability.
Id. at 383.
103. See McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975) (con-
tributory negligence does not bar actions brought under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965)); Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp. 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 356, 367 A.2d 304
(1976) (§ 402B). Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
20
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Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute will have any applica-
tion to cases arising under strict tort liability. With the advent of a
new social consciousness in the field of products liability, and the
corresponding liberalization of the standards of recovery in products
liability situations, 104 this determination becomes particularly signific-
ant in actions arising under section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.105 Our examination of the Act's impact on strict tort liabil-
ity, thus, focuses on the products liability field.
The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act has been ex-
pressly limited in section (a) to "actions brought to recover damages
for negligence." On its face, the Act, therefore excludes strict liabil-
ity. Any argument that the legislature was actually intending to in-
clude strict tort liability in the definition of "negligence" contradicts
prior Pennsylvania judicial authority. First, strict tort liability, as
applied in Pennsylvania, has always been considered liability without
fault or proof of negligence on the part of the defendant. 106 Addi-
tionally, contributory negligence has been abolished as a defense to a
strict tort liability action in Pennsylvania. 107 Moreover, the Supreme
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402B provides:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise,
makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or
quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of
the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
Id. § 402B.
See also McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. at 17 n.5, 342 A.2d at 382 n.5,
citing Federoff v. Harrison Constr. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949). In Federoff, the court
adopted a provision of the Restatement concerning ultrahazardous activity which eliminated the
defense of contributory negligence. 362 Pa. at 183, 66 A.2d at 817, citing RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 519 (1938).
104. See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). In Berkebile, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that a manufacturer could be held liable under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965), without any showing of negligence. 462 Pa. at 94-95, 337 A.2d at 899. In
Azzarello, the supreme court held that the use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" in a jury
instruction in a § 402A case was reversible error. 480 Pa. at 559-60, 391 A.2d at 1027. For the text of
§ 402A, see note 84 supra.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For the text of § 402A, see note 103
supra.
106. See Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). In Berke-
bile, former Chief Justice Jones stated:
The crucial difference between strick [sic] liability and negligence is that the exis-
tence of due care, whether on the part of seller or consumer, is irrelevant. The seller is
responsible for injury caused by his defective product even if he "has exercised all possi-
ble care in the preparation and sale of his product."
Id. at 94, 337 A.2d at 899, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
107. See McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975). See also
cases cited note 104 supra.
1978-1979]
21
Timby and Plevyak: The Effect of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute on Tr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 24: p. 453
Court of Pennsylvania has carefully avoided any imputation of negli-
gence concepts or principles in actions arising under section 402A.10 8
Despite identical restrictions limiting the application of compara-
tive negligence statutes to actions for "negligence," some courts of
other jurisdictions have construed their respective statutes to apply to
products liability actions arising under section 402A. In Dippel v.
Sciano, 10 9 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in dicta stated that strict
tort liability actions under section 402A were subject to Wisconsin's
comparative negligence law. 110 The court found no difficulty in
combining negligence principles with strict liability, concluding that
proof of the necessary elements in a strict liability action in Wisconsin
would constitute a finding of negligence per se. 111 Conduct compris-
ing traditional common law contributory negligence has therefore
been retained as a defense 112 and as a factor in apportioning dam-
ages in a products liability action in Wisconsin. 113 Minnesota
subsequently followed Wisconsin's lead, by applying its comparative
negligence statute to cases arising under section 402A, 114 and the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled that the principles of
comparative negligence, rather than the terms of the state's legislative
enactment, are applicable in strict liability cases. 115 In addition, fed-
eral courts construing the comparative negligence statutes of New
Hampshire, 116 Idaho, "1 7 and the Virgin Islands 118 have also extended
108. See note 104 supra.
109. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
110. Id. at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 64, construing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1966)
(amended 1971).
111. 37 Wis. 2d at 461-62, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
112. Id. at 460, 155 N.W.2d at 63. Voluntary assumption of the risk, which had previously
been a complete bar to recovery in strict liability tort cases, has been merged into contributory
negligence in Wisconsin. See Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 536-37, 219
N.W.2d 393, 395 (1974).
113. Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 532, 536-37, 219 N.W.2d 393, 395
(1974).
114. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., - Minn. -, 262 N.W.2d 377 (1977). In Marier v.
Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (1973), the Supreme Court of
Minnesota held that it would adopt the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's interpretations of the
Wisconsin comparative negligence statute, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979),
in interpreting its own comparative negligence law since Minnesota's statute, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979), was based on the Wisconsin model. 296 Minn. at 244-46, 207
N.W.2d at 708-09.
115. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., __ N.H. __ , 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
116. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977), construed in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501
F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H.
1972). It should be noted that contributory negligence was a defense to a strict products liability
action in New Hampshire prior to the enactment of the comparative negligence statute. Stephan
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970).
117. Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976),
construing IDAHO CODE § 6-801 to -806 (Supp. 1978), The Sun Valley court remarked:
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the respective enactments to products liability cases. Conversly, Col-
orado,119 Oklahoma,120 and a federal court applying Nebraska law 121
have refused to extend comparative negligence statutes limited to
"negligence" actions to products liability actions.
These diverse approaches leave little consistent precedent and
authority for the courts of Pennsylvania to follow.
Given the careful manner in which Pennsylvania courts have dis-
tinguished strict liability from negligence, however,122 the authors
The rationale of Idaho's comparative negligence statute extends to a comparison of all
legal causes of the plaintiff's injuries and results in a sensible and fair method of loss
allocation. No case has come before the Supreme Court of Idaho raising this issue. How-
ever, it is the view of this Court that the Idaho Supreme Court would, if presented with
this issue in a products liability case, apply comparative causation. The result also follows
from the wording of Idaho Code § 6-801 wherein gross negligence is compared with
negligence. Likewise, courts in Idaho, as well as this court, have been comparing negli-
gence per se with ordinary negligence under Idaho Code § 6-801. Strict liability, like
negligence per se, is equally capable of causal comparison.
411 F. Supp. at 603 (footnotes omitted), citing Dipple v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d
55 (1967).
118. Murray v. Beloit Power Sys., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1145 (D.V.I. 1978), construing V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp. 1977). In Murray, the court adopted and applied the position
and policy considerations of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to the Virgin Islands' statute. 450
F. Supp. at 1147. The district court commented that "both plaintiff's want of ordinary due care
in his use of the product and plaintiff's unreasonable exposure to a known and appreciated risk
of injury should work to diminish plaintiff's recovery in a § 402A type action in proportion to
the amount of causative culpable conduct attributable to plaintiff." Id. (footnote omitted).
119. Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976) (cert. denied), construing
COLO. REV. SrAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1976). The court remarked:
Although some other jurisdictions have chosen to apply comparative negligence to
products liability cases, . . .in our view the better-reasoned position is that comparative
negligence has no application to products liability actions under § 402A.
Products liability under § 402A does not rest upon negligence principles, but rather
is premised on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the
stream of commerce .. . .Thus, the focus is upon the nature of the product, and the
consumer's reasonable expectations with regard to that product, rather than on the con-
duct either of the manufacturer or of the person injured because of the product : .
What defendant proposes here is that we inject negligence concepts into an area of liabil-
ity which rests on totally different policy considerations.
37 Colo. App. at 557, 553 P.2d at 837 (citations omitted).
120. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974), construing OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1978-1979). The court found that Oklahoma's comparative negli-
gence statute had no application to products liability cases because the statute had been limited
to "negligence" actions. 521 P.2d at 1367. The court reasoned that products liability cases were
not based on negligence and were not to be treated as a negligence theory of recovery. Id. The
court, however, retained voluntary assumption of the risk of a known defect as a complete bar
to recovery in products liability cases. Id. at 1366.
121. Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, construing NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1964)
(amended 1978). The court noted that application of Nebraska's comparative negligence statute
would be extremely confusing and inappropriate in a strict liability case. 534 F.2d at 802. The
Melia court reasoned that proof of negligence was not required under strict liability, but find-
ings of plaintiff and defendant negligence were required to trigger the Nebraska comparative
negligence statute. Id. In 1978, the Nebraska comparative negligence statute was modified to
encompass strict liability. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, Legis. Bill No. 665, § 6, 1978 Neb. Laws 565 (to
be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151).
122. See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v.
Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
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maintain that the Act will not be directly applied to strict liability
actions in Pennsylvania.
There is, nonetheless, the remaining consideration of whether
the doctrine of strict liability should be judicially modified to bring it
into conformity with the new apportionment system. It should be
remembered that strict tort liability in Pennsylvania is a judicially
created doctrine. 123 Consequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania retains the prerogative to change or modify the doctrine as it
deems appropriate. 124 A decision to do so will depend upon several
important considerations concerning the philosophy of products liabil-
ity and the countervailing notion of apportioning fault.
It should be noted that many of these policy considerations have
been evaluated by the appellate courts of Alaska, 125 California, 126 and
Florida, 127 which have judicially implemented the comparative negli-
gence, or more appropriately, the comparative fault, concept into the
tort law of their respective jurisdictions. Weighing the underlying so-
cial policy considerations involved in a decision to extend comparative
fault to strict liability situations, these courts have unanimously con-
cluded that comparative negligence has a place in products liability
actions. 128
123. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
124. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania "has not been reluctant to simplify, clarify, and
improve the law in light of modern conditions." Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 612
n.27, 327 A.2d 94, 100 n.27 (1974) (citations omitted). Concerning the application of res ipsa
loquitur, the court further stated: "This is true even when we are dealing with legal principles
of long standing." id. (citations omitted). The supreme court has in fact exercised its prerogative
to modify the application of strict products liability in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Azzarello v. Black
Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa.
83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
125. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976). See note
128 infra.
126. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978). See note 128 infra.
127. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976). See note 128 infra.
128. For example, in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978), the Supreme Court of California remarked:
In ... [Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975)], we announced a system of pure comparative negligence "the fundamental purpose
of which shall be to assign responsibility and liability for damage in direct proportion to
the amount of negligence of each of the parties." . ..Those same underlying considera-
tions of policy which moved us judicially in Li to rescue blameworthy plaintiffs from a
100-year-old sanction against all recovery persuade us now to extend similar principles to
the strict products liability area. Legal responsibility is thereby shared. We think that
apportioning tort liability is sound, logical and capable of wider application than to negli-
gence cases alone. To hold otherwise, in our view, would be to perpetuate a system
which, as we noted in Li, Dean Prosser describes as placing " . .. upon one party the
entire burden of loss for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible." . .. We reiterate
that our reason for extending a full system of comparative fault to strict products liability
is because it is fair to do so. The law consistently seeks to elevate justice and equity above
476
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/3
1978-1979] COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA 477
Two arguments have been advanced against application of com-
parative fault in products liability cases. One is that the public policy
reasons for strict liability in products liability cases are incompatible
with comparative negligence.1 29  The second is that it is theoretically
difficult to compare the strict liability of the defendant with the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff.130 Both arguments have been
rejected by the courts. 13 1
For example, the Supreme Court of Alaska has concluded that
the public policy reasons for strict products liability are not incompati-
ble with comparative negligence.1 32  According to the court, the
"basic public policy reasoning for strict liability [is] that manufacturers
should bear the costs of injury resulting from their marketing of de-
the exact contours of mathematical equation. We are convinced that in merging the two
principles what may be lost in symmetry is more than gained in fundamental fairness.
Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (emphasis in original), quoting Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875; W. PROSSER, supra note 5,
§ 67, at 433.
In Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976), the
Supreme Court of Alaska stated:
We find it unnecessary to conceptualize the theory of the action which strict liability
creates in order for us to apply comparative negligence principles to strict products liabil-
ity cases which result in personal injuries. Whether the action is characterized as negli-
gence, warranty, or in tort, the plaintiff must prove essentially the same elements to
recover. Further, most of the cases of strict liability for defective products have recog-
nized a defense based on the conduct of the plaintiff, for courts have been unwilling to
disregard the plaintiff's conduct to interpret strict liability to mean absolute liability even
though they may have differed as to the defense itself. The seller has not been converted
into an insurer of his product with respect to all harm generated by its use.
• ..We feel that pure comparative negligence can provide a predicate of fairness to
products liability cases in which the plaintiff and defendant contribute to the injury. The
defendant is strictly liable due to the existence of a defective condition in the product. On
the other hand, the plaintiff's liability attaches as a result of his conduct in using the
product. It is appropriate, therefore, that the parties' contribution to the injury be appor-
tioned. The defendant is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective product,
except that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's con-
tribution to his injury.
Id. at 45-46 (footnotes omitted).
In West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976), the Supreme Court of
Florida similarly concluded that "[c]ontributory or comparative negligence is a defense in a
strict liability action if based upon grounds other than the failure of the user to discover the
defect in the product or the failure of the user to guard against the possibility of its existence."
Id. at 92.
Cf. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir.
1977) (policy considerations in applying comparative negligence to a strict products liability case
arising under admiralty cases discussed).
129. See Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976) (cert. denied). In
Kinard, the court stressed that, due to the placing of products on the market, products liability
was based upon enterprise liability rather than upon fault. Id. at 557, 553 P.2d at 837.
130. See Beasley & Tunstall, Jury Instructions Concerning Multiple Defendants and Strict
Liability After the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act, Symposium: Comparative Negli-
gence in Pennsylvania, 24 VILL. L. REV. 518, 535-36 (1979).
131. See text accompanying notes 132-35 infra; note 137 and accompanying text infra.
132. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46 (Alas. 1976).
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fective products rather than the injured party who is essentially pow-
erless to protect himself." 133 The Alaska court explained that under
comparative negligence, the defendant manufacturer would still be
strictly liable for the harm caused by a defective product, but not for
the harm caused by the consumer's own conduct. 134 The Supreme
Court of California, following a similar reasoning, has also concluded
that comparative negligence does not conflict with the public policy
underlying strict product liability and, indeed, has suggested that ap-
plication of comparative negligence to strict liability produces a far
more equitable result.135
The theoretical difficulty of balancing a seller's strict liability
against the user's negligence has been recognized by one com-
mentator as a problem which is more apparent than real. 136 The
Supreme Court of Alaska has similarly noted that the experience of
certain courts in comparing negligence and strict liability frequently
does not support the argument that such a system would be too dif-
ficult for the courts and juries to administer. 137
The reader must be cautioned that these decisions by the su-
preme courts of Alaska, California, and Florida involve jurisdictions
which have judicially adopted "pure" comparative negligence. 138 The
results are therefore not directly applicable in Pennsylvania, which
has a statutory "50%" system of comparative negligence. The analyses
of the policy considerations provided by these courts, however, are
applicable and persuasive in connection with the issue of whether the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania should modify the concept of strict
133. Id. at 44.
134. Id. at 46.
135. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 744, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380
(1978). See note 128 supra.
136. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 12.7, at 208-09. Professor Schwartz states:
It is true that the jury might have some difficulty in making the calculation required
under comparative negligence when defendant's responsibility is based on strict liability.
Nevertheless, this obstacle is more conceptual than practical. The jury should always be
capable, when the plaintiff has been objectively at fault, of taking into account how much
bearing that fault had on the amount of damage suffered and of adjusting and reducing
the award accordingly. Triers of fact are apparently able to do this, and the benefits from
the approach suggest that it be applied in all comparative negligence jurisdictions.
Id. (emphasis in original).
137. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alas. 1976). The
Butaud court observed:
Comparative negligence systems have long been employed in other jurisdictions, and
experience has not borne out the argument that the system is difficult for courts and
juries to administer. Noteworthy in this regard are admiralty cases in which the rule of
comparative negligence has been applied without serious problems to cases arising under
the doctrine of unseaworthiness, which is a form of strict liability.
Id. at 45 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
138. See notes 27-29 and accompanying' text supra.
[VOL. 24: p. 453
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liability to allow for consideration of a plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence in the use of the product in order to achieve a more equitable
result. 139
A related concern is the application, if any, of comparative negli-
gence to an action involving multiple defendants where one is held
strictly liable to the plaintiff and another is held liable under negli-
gence principles. 140 One must also determine the extent to which
comparative negligence will operate to diminish a plaintiff's recovery
and the manner in which comparative negligence will govern the re-
sponsibility of the defendants inter se. The authors submit that the
most equitable result is achieved in both of these situations when the
comparative fault and culpability of all the parties are appor-
tioned. 141 Anything less than total apportionment results in the re-
tention of the harsh "all-or-nothing" form of tort compensation which
the new era of "comparative negligence consciousness' is intended to
eliminate.
IV. THE IMPACT ON OTHER TORT DOCTRINES
A. Assumption of the Risk
Under Pennsylvania common law, a person who voluntarily ex-
poses himself to a known or obvious danger is deemed to assume the
attendant risk and cannot recover for personal injuries sustained as
a result of exposure to that risk. 142 Although the defense of con-
tributory negligence has been eliminated in strict products liability
139. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 12.7, at 209. Professor Schwartz cautions:
The conceptual difficulty in strict liability cases does preclude a return of contribu-
tory negligence as a complete defense under the modified comparative negligence sta-
tutes. An attempt to apply the modification in this way would seriously undermine
policies of risk distribution that underlie strict liability. In light of the fact that courts are
in fact utilizing comparative negligence principles from their respective states' compara-
tive negligence statutes rather than applying the letter of that legislation itself, it would
seem that they have the power to apply whatever comparative negligence system is ap-
propriate to strict liability. If courts follow this suggested approach, comparative negli-
gence will enhance and facilitate the development of strict liability theory, rather than
cause additional problems.
Id.
140. For examples of factual situations involving strictly liable and negligent defendants, see,
e.g., Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Nest-Cart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
141. See Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products
Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1974); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Neg-
ligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974); Comment, The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence
Act: The Fifty-One Percent Solution, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 352, 362-63 (1977).
142. Pritchard v. Leggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 987 (1966) (applying Pennsylvania law); Kopp v. R.S. Noonan, Inc., 385 Pa. 460, 123
A.2d 429 (1956); Hall v. Ziegler, 361 Pa. 228, 64 A.2d 767 (1949).
1978-1979]
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cases, 143 the assumption of the risk defense has been retained as a
complete bar to recovery in such cases. 144 With the advent of a
comparative negligence statute in Pennsylvania, the question now be-
comes whether the assumption of the risk defense will be merged
into the concept of comparative negligence or whether it will survive
as a separate defense which bars recovery.
Any analysis of this issue requires a careful interpretation of the
confusing treatment of this issue. As noted by Dean Prosser, much of
this confusion has occurred "because 'assumption of risk' has been
used by the courts in several different senses, which have been
lumped together under the one name, usually without realizing that
any differences exist, and certainly with no effort to make them
clear." 145 Since either defense was a complete bar to the plaintiff's
action, it is not surprising that the two defenses were not clearly dis-
tinguished. The distinction between these defenses actually had sig-
nificance only after the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in actions
arising under section 402A, abolished the contributory negligence de-
fense 146 and retained the assumption of the risk defense. 147 Since
that time, the Pennsylvania courts have struggled with the confusing
and sometimes inconsistent authorities in this area 148 and have elabo-
rated a clear distinction between the two defenses. 1 49
143. McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975). In McCown,
the court adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965), which pro-
vides: "Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its
existence." Id. 463 Pa. at 15-16, 342 A.2d at 382.
144. Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966).
145. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 68, at 439 (footnote omitted).
146. McCown v. JInternational Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975).
147. Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966).
148. Much of the confusion has resulted from the different approaches employed in various
jurisdictions. For example, many jurisdictions have adopted the analysis set forth in W. PROS-
SER, supra note 5, § 68, at 440, where assumption of the risk is divided into three categories: 1)
where plaintiff, in advance, gives consent to relieve defendant of a legal duty and to take a
chance of injury from a known risk; 2) where plaintiff acts reasonably and voluntarily encounters
a risk with knowledge that defendant will not protect him; and 3) where plaintiff acts unreason-
ably by voluntarily exposing himself to a risk created by defendant's negligence. id. The focus
in this analysis is on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct.
A second analysis is that suggested by Harper and James in their treatise on the law of
torts. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 75, § 21.1 at 1162. Express assumption of the risk is
separated and treated independently while implied assumption of the risk is divided into pri-
mary and secondary applications. Id. This analysis has also been followed in several jurisdic-
tions. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); Ritter v.
Beals, 225 Or. 504, 521, 358 P.2d 1080, 1085 (1961). The approach was also nominally applied
in Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
149. See text accompanying notes 150-59 infra.
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The federal courts which have applied Pennsylvania law have
probably articulated the most lucid distinction between contributory
negligence and assumption of the risk. 150 Most noteworthy is the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co.,151 where the court
divided the Pennsylvania assumption of risk cases into two categories
based upon the application of the defense by the courts. 15 2  The
Pritchard court defined assumption of the risk in its primary and
strict sense as a "voluntary exposure to an obvious known danger
which negates liability." 153 Assumption of the risk in its secondary
sense was defined by the Third Circuit as "ordinarily synonymous
with contributory negligence and involv[ing] a failure to exercise
reasonable care for one's own safety." 154 Although this method of
analysis was not original 155 and has been applied in other jurisdic-
tions, 156 the Third Circuit in Pritchard carefully applied the distinc-
tion to Pennsylvania law.
An examination of the cases in Pennsylvania in light of Pritchard
reveals that assumption of the risk in its secondary sense has to a
great extent been merged into the definition of contributory negli-
gence. 15 7 Conversely, the holding of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania in Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 158 and the decisions of other
courts which have adopted the Ferraro holding, demonstrate that as-
sumption of the risk in its primary and strict sense exists as a separate
and distinct defense from that of the defense of contributory negli-
gence. 15 9
This distinction is a result of the differing policies supporting the
defenses and their relationship to the strict liability cause of action.
Contributory negligence in its true sense should not bar recovery in a
strict liability case since the risk of loss is better imposed upon the
150. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966); Stephenson v. College Misericordia, 376 F. Supp. 1324, 1327
(M.D. Pa. 1974).
151. 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
152. 350 F.2d at 484.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 75, § 21.1 at 1162.
156. See cases cited note 148 supra.
157. See Stephenson v. College Misericordia, 376 F. Supp. 1324, 1327 (M.D. Pa. 1974). See
Joyce v. Quinn, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 580, 587-88, 205 A.2d 611, 614-15 (1964).
158. 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966).
159. See Henrich v. Cutler Hammer Co., 460 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1972); Elder v. Crawley
Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1971); McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa.
13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975).
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manufacturer or seller. The defense of assumption of the risk, how-
ever, is based on a policy of refusing to allow persons who consciously
expose themselves to danger to recover. 160 In view of these varying
policy considerations, it is submitted that Pennsylvania's Comparative
Negligence Act should not operate to confuse the lines of distinction.
The experience of other jurisdictions is not necessarily helpful
because of the diverse approaches in analyzing assumption of the
risk. 161 It should initially be noted that several states have merged
assumption of the risk into contributory negligence in their respective
comparative negligence statutes. 162 Although many others have
merged the doctrines judicially, 163 most of these jurisdictions have
done so while carefully qualifying or restricting the merger, thereby
allowing conduct which has been termed assumption of the risk to
operate as a complete bar in certain situations.1 64  For example, Wis-
160. See McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 18-19, 342 A.2d 381, 383-84
(1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring). In a concurring opinion, Justice Pomeroy reasoned:
The strict liability of Section 402A is founded in part upon the belief that as between
the sellers of products and those who use them, the former are the better able to bear the
losses caused by defects in the products involved .. . .This greater loss-bearing capacity
is unrelated to negligence in the manufacture or marketing of products. Indeed, retail and
wholesale sellers of chattels are themselves often in no position to discover or avoid de-
fects in their inventories, even by the exercise of a high degree of care. Thus, defendants
in Section 402A actions are subjected to liability without regard to fault. It is a proper
corollary to this principle that the lesser loss-bearing capacity of product users exists in-
dependently of their negligence or lack of it. It follows that such negligence should not
ordinarily or necessarily operate to preclude recovery in a strict liability case. On the
other hand, where assumption of risk is involved, the "loss-bearing" policy underlying
Section 402A is outweighed by a countervailing policy, one which refuses recovery to
persons who consciously expose themselves to known dangers. This policy is deemed
stronger than the one, reflected in the normal law of contributory negligence, which
denies recovery to individuals whose conduct is merely lacking in due care under the
circumstances.
Id. (citations omitted).
161. See note 148 supra.
162. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
52-572h (West Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y.
Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-1413 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp.
1978-1979); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 18.470-.510 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN §§ 78-27-37 to -43 (1977).
The 1971 version of the Oregon statute provided that "[c]ontributory negligence, including as-
sumption of the risk, shall not bar a recovery." Act of June 30, 1971, ch. 668, 1971 Or. Laws
1516 (amended 1975). The Oregon Court of Appeals construed "assumption of the risk" in the
statute to mean assumption of the risk in the secondary sense, i.e., as merely a designation for a
type of contributory negligence. See Becker v. Beaverton School Dist. No. 48, 25 Or. App. 879,
882-85, 551 P.2d 498, 500-01 (1976). See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 75, § 21.1, at
1163. Assumption of the risk in its primary sense, see id., thus remained a valid defense under
the Oregon statute. 25 Or. App. at 882, 551 P.2d at 501. The statutory ambiguity is clarified in
the current version which deletes the phrase "including assumption of the risk." See OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.470 (1977).
163. See notes 165-74 and accompanying text infra.
164. For the sole jurisdiction which has expressly abrogated comparative negligence as a
defense, see note 162 supra.
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consin, which was one of the earlier jurisdictions to merge assump-
tion of the risk into contributory negligence,165 retained the defense
in certain situations which are denominated as "express assumption of
risk." 166 Florida has also merged the two doctrines except for what
has been termed "express assumption of the risk," 167 which appears
to fall 'within the definition of Pennsylvania's primary assumption of
the risk.168 Other jurisdictions which have to some extent merged
assumption of the risk into contributory negligence are California,169
Minnesota, 170 Maine, 171 and Mississippi. 172 The Virgin Islands 173
and Washington appear to be the only jurisdictions which have
abolished assumption of the risk as a separate defense as a result of
their comparative negligence systems.174
Four states, although not fully explaining their rationale, have
retained assumption of the risk as a separate, complete defense de-
spite the enactment of comparative negligence statutes. 175 Although
Rhode Island has completely rejected the notion of merging the two
doctrines,176 the authors submit that the result in Rhode Island is
165. See Gibson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63 (1963); McConville v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
166. Polsky v. Levine, 73 Wis. 2d 547, 243 N.W.2d 503 (1976) (by implication).
167. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977) (express assumption of the risk retained
as a complete bar).
168. See text accompanying notes 151-54 & 157-59 supra.
169. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Paula
v. Gagnon, 81 Cal. App. 3d 680, 146 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1978); Gonzalez v. Garcia, 75 Cal. App. 3d
874, 142 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1977).
170. Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
171. Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976).
172. Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1973). The Supreme Court of
Mississippi stated that it did "not abolish the doctrine of assumption of risk, but where assump-
tion of risk overlaps and coincides with contributory negligence the rules of the defense of
contributory negligence shall apply." Id. at 677.
173. Murray v. Beloit Power Sys., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 1145 (D.V.I. 1978). The Murray court
remarked that "under the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute the affirmative defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk should be considered together as a single
defense, that is, the degree which the plaintiff's own culpable conduct contributed to his acci-
dent and injuries." 450 F. Supp. at 1146, construing V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp.
1977).
174. Lyons v. Redding Const. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 86, 515 P.2d 821 (1973) (dicta). The authors
suggest that the abolishment was, in fact, a merger with contributory negligence.
175. Spradlin v. Klump, 244 Ark. 841, 427 S.W.2d 542 (1968); Yankey v. Battle, 122 Ga.
App. 275, 176 S.E.2d 714 (1970); Mason v. Western Power & Gas Co., 183 Neb. 392, 160
N.W.2d 204 (1968); Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654 (1958).
176. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., - R.I. __ , 376 A.2d 329 (1977). The
court stated:
In our understanding, then, contributory negligence and assumption of the risk do
not overlap; the key difference is, of course, the exercise of one's free will in encountering
the risk. Negligence analysis, couched in reasonable man hypotheses, has no place in the
assumption of the risk framework. When one acts knowingly, it is immaterial whether he
acts reasonably. The postulate, then, that assumption of the risk is merely a variant of
contributory fault, is not, to our minds, persuasive. Accordingly, it is our determination
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similar to that reached in those jurisdictions which have qualifiedly
merged the two doctrines in certain situations. 177
In reviewing the action of the courts construing the comparative
negligence doctrines, one must avoid merely compiling a list of cases
in which contributory negligence and assumption of the risk have
been "merged" without considering the context in which the terms
were being applied when the particular court decided to merge the
defenses. It is also important to note the degree to which a court has
reserved its judgment on certain portions of the assumption of the
risk defense and to what extent it has expressly retained the viability
of the concept. The authors suggest that careful analysis reveals that a
majority of the jurisdictions have retained, by one name or another,
that form of voluntary assumption of the risk which has been denomi-
nated by the Pritchard court as assumption of the risk in a primary
and strict sense. 178 As has been suggested, the Pennsylvania courts
have already merged contributory negligence with assumption of the
risk in those situations where assumption of the risk was merely an
application of traditional contributory negligence. 179
As properly applied in Pennsylvania, voluntary assumption of the
risk in its primary and strict sense has few, if any, of the attributes of
negligence. The 'Standard of conduct being considered exceeds
inattentiveness and is in the nature of consent. It approaches and
sometimes involves the same kind of deliberate conduct which is
considered in evaluating the liability of defendants in intentional tort
actions. This conclusion is supported not only by the history of the
development of assumption of the risk, 180 but also by considerations
of the nature of the conduct being evaluated. 181 In summary,' it is
submitted that the merger in Pennsylvania of assumption of the risk
that . . . [Rhode Island's comparative negligence statute] does not affect the validity of
assumption of the risk as a complete bar to recovery.
Id. at -, 376 A.2d at 333 (citation omitted), construing R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1
(Supp. 1978).
177. Compare cases cited notes 165-74 supra with note 176 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 151-53 supra.
179. See cases cited note 157 supra.
180. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 9.5, at 173. Professor Schwartz reasoned that as-
sumption of the risk developed theoretically because the defense was "based not so much on
plaintiff's fault as on his agreement by his conduct to take the risk of the very consequences
that befell him. Viewed from that perspective, it is a cousin of the consent defense to inten-
tional torts." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
181. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 68, at 441. Dean Prosser remarked "that assumption
of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and intelligent acquiescence in it, while con-
tributory negligence is a matter of some fault or departure from the standard of conduct of the
reasonable man." Id.
[VOL. 24: p. 453
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in its secondary sense and contributory negligence fully responds to
the policy considerations involved in applying Pennsylvania's com-
parative negligence statute. To the extent that assumption of the risk
survives at common law in its primary and strict sense, the Act
should have no effect.
B. Discovered Peril Doctrine
One of the early doctrines developed to moderate the harsh ef-
fect of contributory negligence in certain situations was the concept of
"last clear chance." 182 This doctrine had its origin in the 1842 En-
glish case of Davies v. Mann, 183 in which the plaintiff left his animal
on the highway and the defendant negligently drove into it. 1 84  The
court held that the plaintiff might recover regardless of his contribu-
tory negligence if the defendant had had, by exercising proper care,
the last clear opportunity to avoid the accident and yet failed to do
so. ' This notion was eventually introduced into American jurispru-
dence under the name of "last clear chance" or "last clear opportu-
nity." 186
Although it has been said that Pennsylvania has not adopted the
"last clear chance" doctrine, 187 the related doctrine of "discovered
peril" has been considered and applied by the Pennsylvania
courts. 188  Moreover, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has never embraced the doctrine of "last clear chance,"
the concept has been recognized by that court as a factor in determin-
ing proximate causation. 189 Furthermore, the "willful, wanton, or
reckless" conduct concept in Pennsylvania is similar to the underlying
rule of "last clear chance" or "discovered peril." 190 In spite of this
limited application, the question remains as to whether "discovered
182. See id. § 66, at 427.
183. 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. D. 1842).
184. Id. at 546-47, 152 Eng. Rep. at 588.
185. Id. at 548-49, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589.
186. For a general discussion of the "last clear chance" doctrine, see W. PRoSsER, supra note
5, § 66, at 427-33.
187. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943). The Kasanovich court stated:
Nor has Pennsylvania adopted the doctrine of the "last clear chance" that, notwithstand-
ing negligence on the part of the injured person, the tortfeasor will be held liable if, by
the exercise of reasonable care, he could have discovered the peril to which the other had
exposed himself, and then, by due care, could have avoided the accident.
Id. at 202, 34 A.2d at 525.
188. Lehman v. McCleary, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 508, 329 A.2d 862 (1974); Curt v. Ziman, 140
Pa. Super. Ct. 25, 12 A.2d 802 (1940); Hess v. Kemmerer, 65 Pa. Super. Ct. 247 (1916).
189. See Coleman v. Dahl, 371 Pa. 639, 92 A.2d 678 (1952).
190. See notes 71-74 and accompanying text supra.
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peril" should survive the application of comparative negligence in
Pennsylvania. The authors submit that it should not.
The experience of those comparative negligence jurisdictions
which have recognized the "last clear chance" doctrine might help to
resolve this issue if there were any consistent trend in the treatment
of the doctrine. Unfortunately, there is a wide split of authority.
Some states have retained the "last clear chance" doctrine regardless
of the adoption of comparative negligence in their jurisdictions. 191 On
the other hand, several jurisdictions have eliminated this common law
doctrine in light of their state's comparative negligence statute. 192
The remaining jurisdictions with both "last clear chance" and com-
parative negligence statutes are either undecided or have not yet con-
sidered the issue.
Regardless of this split of authority, the authors submit that "last
clear chance" or "discovered peril" serves no equitable purpose in a
comparative negligence jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania "discovered
peril" doctrine should be recognized as a device created to allow a
negligent plaintiff to overcome the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence in a situation where the defendant's culpable conduct was gross
in comparison to that of the plaintiff's. In this regard, the reasons for
advocating extinction of the "discovered peril" doctrine are the same
as those for abrogation of the concept of "willful, wanton, or reckless"
conduct. 193 Although these concepts have served well in balancing
the equities in a contributory negligence situation, they are no longer
appropriate where culpability is to be allocated and the plaintiff's neg-
ligence serves only to diminish, rather than bar, recovery.
Although two leading commentators on comparative negligence
have acknowledged the wide split of authority on this issue, both
have criticized the retention of "last clear chance" under a compara-
tive negligence system.1 94 Moreover, the commentators on the new
comparative negligence statute in Pennsylvania have been unanimous
in advocating a merger of the considerations applicable in the
"discovered peril" doctrine into contributory negligence in Pennsyl-
vania. 1 95 The authors join with the foregoing in calling for merger of
191. Lovett v. Sandersville R.R., 72 Ga. App. 692, 34 S.E.2d 644 (1945); Bezdek v. Patrick,
170 Neb. 522, 103 N.W.2d 318 (1960); Vlach v. Wyman, 78 S.D. 504, 104 N.W.2d 817 (1960).
192, Burns v. Ottati, 513 P.2d 469 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Cushman v. Perkins, 245 A.2d 846
(Me. 1968).
193. See notes 75-79 and accompanying text supra.
194. See C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1.220, at 41
(1978); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 7.2, at 133. See also Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1258 (1958).
195. Sherman, An Analysis of Pennsylvania's Comparative Negligence Statute, 38 U. PITT. L.
REV. 51, 76-77 (1976); Comment, supra note 141, at 367-68; 81 DICK. L. REV. 677, 679 (1977).
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"discovered peril" into contributory negligence under Pennsylvania's
comparative negligence application, thereby allowing the jury to ap-
portion liability in damages as they see fit.
V. SOME PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Special Verdict Procedures
1. The Hill Amendment
On the Act's third consideration in the Pennsylvania Senate,
Senator Louis Hill proposed an amendment to the Senate Bill which
provided for a special verdict procedure to be implemented in com-
parative negligence cases. 196 Essentially, the amendment provided
that the court or jury would make either specific findings of fact or
"answer specific questions indicating: (1) The amount of damages
which the party bringing the action would be entitled to recover had
that person not been at fault. (2) The degree of negligence of. each
party expressed as a percentage." 197 The court would then be re-
quired to reduce the amount of the verdict in proportion to the
amount of negligence attributable to the party recovering. 198 If the
negligence of the plaintiff were equal to or greater than the negli-
gence of the defendant, judgment would be entered for the defen-
dant. l99
At least eleven of the comparative negligence statutes enacted to
date have incorporated a special verdict procedure similar to the one
proposed in the Hill amendment.200  The procedures have received
increasing attention in practically all of the states which have adopted
comparative negligence, particularly those which have adopted "50%"
systems. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Senate defeated Senator
Hill's amendment, and the original Senate Bill eventually passed both
the Senate and the House without a single change.201
196. Proposed Amendment to S.B. 1237, 160th Gen. Assembly, 1976 Sess., 1 PA. LEG. J.
1703 (Senate 1976).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1976); HAWV. REV. STAT. § 663-31 (Supp.
1975); IDAHO CODE § 6-802 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(b) (Stipp. 1978); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp.
1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2 (West Supp. 1978-1979);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (1977); Wyo. STAT. ANN.§1-1-109 (1977),
201. 1 PA. LEG. J. 1707-08 (Senate 1976). See Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 855, No. 152, 1976
Pa. Laws 855.
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The defeat of Senator Hill's amendment would seem to indicate
that the legislature was not interested in implementing special verdict
procedures as part of the Pennsylvania comparative negligence sys-
tem. The authors, however, are not convinced. The comments made
during the Senate debate on Senator Hill's amendments demonstrate
no discernible majority disapproval of special verdict procedures in
comparative negligence cases. 20 2  Much of the debate regarding the
amendments concerned Senator Hill's corollary amending provision
which would have changed the wording of the first section of the Act
to allow recovery only when a person's contributory negligence was
'not as great as" instead of "not greater than" the negligence of the
defendant, as provided in the original version. 20 3  In addition, two
Senators who eventually voted against the amendments spoke in favor
of the special verdict procedures in comparative negligence cases .204
Finally, it must be remembered that the Act was being considered
for passage in the waning days before a legislative recess. Any
amendment proposed at such a time would receive limited interest
since lengthy debate or thorough consideration might have jeopar-
dized the passage of any legislation on the matter.205
202. 1 PA. LEG. J. 1703-07 (Senate 1976).
203. See id. at 1706-07. For example, Senator Jubelirer stated:
[I]f there is nothing in the bill which takes away the right to file a counterclaim, if the
gentleman from Philadelphia, Senator Hill, is concerned about if the plaintiff is fifty per
cent negligent and if the defendant is fifty per cent negligent, would it not be, for all
practicality, good strategy on the part of the defendant to file a counterclaim and, thus, if
the jury found each of them fifty per cent negligent, would that not be a wipe out.
The doctrine of comparative negligence . . . certainly is a doctrine whose time has
come. If a plaintiff were to recover fifty per cent of what is asked for, then that is really
the change in the law which we are seeking. We are seeking to compensate the plaintiff
for only that to which he is entitled, and if that be fifty per cent or forty per cent, or
what-have-you, I think that the juries would come to the proper decision.
Id. at 1706 (remarks of Sen. Jubelirer). Senator Hager, the bill's sponsor, remarked:
[R]ather than worry about whether a person can recover if he is equally to blame, what
we should be considering is, how much should a person contribute to pay for the damages
of a person that he has caused and if he has caused your accident fifty per cent, why
should he not respond in fifty per cent of the damages ....
I ask all Members . . . to beat the amendments and support the bill.
Id. at 1707 (remarks of Sen. Hager).
204. Senator Kelley stated: "It is absolutely necessary, without the amendments of the gen-
tleman, that this bill, becoming law, that the courts would have to make the findings of fact
which he has set forth in his amendments, and that the jury would have to find the percen-
tages." Id. at 1705 (remarks of Sen. Kelley). Senator Hager also spoke in favor of the procedure.
See text accompanying note 206 infra.
205. This was perhaps recognized by the Senators themselves during debate on the amend-
ments. Senator Hill, in proposing the amendments, stated: "I ask that the Senate adopt these
amendments. They are not an attempt to delay this bill. They are not an attempt to have the
bill go over in its order." 1 PA. LEc. J. 1704 (Senate 1978) (remarks of Sen. Hill). At least one
legislator, Senator Duflfield, disagreed, stating that "the gentleman mentioned the personal as-
pect that he did not intend to sabotage the bill by introducing these amendments. I think this
would sabotage the bill." Id. at 1704 (remarks of Sen. Dufield).
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Although Senator Hill's special verdict proposal was widely
criticized, the intent of the Hill amendment was not necessarily re-
jected. Senator Hager, principal sponsor of the original Senate bill,
remarked:
In Wisconsin, in proper cases, there is a request by the judge for
special verdicts from a jury, so that the language which the gen-
tleman from Philadelphia, Senator Hill, has put in as the second
portion of his amendment already is called for in the law and if the
judge wishes to do it in a proper case it can be done. I think there
is a possibility of it leading to confusion in some simple cases and it
is not necessary across the board. For that reason, I oppose that
portion of the amendments.
20 6
Senator Hager therefore appeared to have recognized the need for
special verdict procedures in the "proper case." Consequently; his
remarks demonstrate that the defeat of the amendment did not mean
that special verdict procedures should never be employed. On the
contrary, in the "proper case," they should be employed.
Even though the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure currently
provide for special interrogatories in cases involving additional
defendants, 20 7 it is doubtful whether this rule adequately deals with
the special problematic considerations in comparative negligence
situations. Additionally, the procedures under the rule would have no
application to two party actions. It is therefore submitted that the
special verdict must be adopted in multiple defendant situations. Fur-
thermore, the interests of consistency and unbiased fact-finding seem
to dictate the need for specific fact-finding in all comparative negli-
gence cases.
2. The Wisconsin Special Verdict
Although Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute does not
include a specific special verdict provision, Wisconsin does have a
general statute on special verdicts 208 which is presently lacking in
Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has indicated that
this special verdict statute should always be used in jury tried com-
parative negligence cases.209 According to the Wisconsin procedure,
the court prepares written questions for the jury relating to material
issues of fact and providing for a direct answer.210 The court retains
206. Id. at 1707 (remarks of Sen. Hager) (emphasis added).
207. PA. R. Civ. P. 2257.
208. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.27 (West 1957).
209. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, § 17.4, at 284.
210. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 270.27 (West 1957).
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the discretion to submit the questions in terms of ultimate facts or in
the form of separate questions as to the component issues of the ulti-
mate fact. 2 1 ' The trial court also has the prerogative to direct the
jury to find upon particular questions of fact if they render a general
verdict.2 1 2
Perhaps it was these Wisconsin procedures Senator Hager had in
mind when he remarked that the special verdict is "already called for
in the law and if a judge wishes to do it in a proper case it can be
done." 213 Considering Senator Hager's recognition of the confusion
which may result in simple comparative negligence cases, it is
reasonable to conclude that Senator Hager supports a discretionary
special verdict procedure such as that used in Wisconsin and six other
jurisdictions,2 1 4 and merely objected to Senator Hill's proposed pro-
cedures because they were mandatory.2 15
The authors are convinced that Pennsylvania needs a special ver-
dict procedure requiring some form of specific fact-finding on the part
of the jury. The reasons for special verdict procedures seem logical
and straightforward. First, the procedure has a tendency to ascertain
fact, not tainted by prejudice, bias, or a desire to see one particular
party win. Second, a special verdict permits a court to isolate an issue
not dealt with properly by the jury, thus allowing for something less
than a total reversal in all cases of error. These arguments in favor of
the special verdict procedure have been vigorously advanced by
three recognized commentators in the comparative negligence
field. 216  Two of these commentators, Wisconsin lawyers Carroll R.
Heft and C. James Heft, have labelled the special verdict "the very
cornerstone of the comparative negligence concept." 217 Numerous
scholarly reviews and articles also support the use of special verdict
procedures in comparative negligence cases. 218
211. Id.
212. id.
213. See text accompanying note 206 supra.
214. See IDAHO CODE § 6-802 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27-38 (1977); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (1977).
215. Special verdict procedures are mandatory in five jurisdictions which have comparative
negligence statutes. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 663-31 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(b) (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231,
§ 85 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2 (West Supp. 1978-1979). Two other
jurisdictions require the use of a general verdict. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp.
1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973).
216. C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, supra note 194, § 8.10, at 1-2; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5,
§ 17.4, at 282-91.
217. C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, supra note 194, § 8.10, at 1.
218. See, e.g., Cadena, Comparative Negligence and the Special Verdict, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
688 (1974); Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tort-Feasors, and the Effect
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3. The Practical Approach
Since the Comparative Negligence Act does not contain special
verdict procedures, such as are required by the New Hampshire and
Vermont statutes, 219 it seems reasonable to conclude that the task of
developing these procedures now rests with the judiciary. As pro-
vided in the Pennsylvania constitution, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania retains "the power to prescribe general rules governing
practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts."220 It is perhaps
with this understanding that the General Assembly saw no need to
include mandatory special verdict procedures in the Act.
It is therefore necessary to determine the type of special verdict
procedure that should be adopted in Pennsylvania. The authors
suggest that the Wisconsin procedure seems the most appropriate be-
cause Pennsylvania's comparative negligence system was in fact mod-
eled after the one adopted and used in Wisconsin. 2 2 1 Moreover,
Wisconsin's forty-five years of experience with the special verdict in
comparative negligence cases would be of immeasureable aid to the
Pennsylvania courts in their efforts to facilitate the implementation of
the Pennsylvania comparative negligence doctrine.
B. Informing The Jury
Closely tied to the verdict procedures in comparative negligence
matters is the issue of whether or not the jury should be informed of
the results of their specific answers. This issue is obviously moot if
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania retains the general verdict proce-
dures in such cases, because a general verdict necessitates that the
jury thoroughly understand the operation of the law before rendering
its net verdict in favor of one or more parties. Assuming that the
supreme court does adopt special verdict procedures for use in com-
parative negligence cases, one must then ask whether the jury should
be informed of the net effect of their answers.
Some states have provided the answer in their comparative neg-
ligence statutes. For example, the comparative negligence enactments
of Connecticut 222 and Maine 223 require that the jury be informed of
of a Release-A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 406, 412-17; Com-
ment, Comparative Negligence in Washington, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 737, 749 (1973).
219. See note 215 supra.
220. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10(c).
221. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
222. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1978).
223. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Supp. 1978-1979).
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the result of its answers. Since the statutes of New Hampshire 224 and
Vermont 225 expressly provide for a general verdict, it is necessary
that the jury in these states also be informed of the operation of the
law. North Dakota's statute provides for informing the jury only upon
request of one of the parties. 226 The remaining general comparative
negligence statutes, like Pennsylvania's, are silent as to jury informa-
tion.
In the absence of such a statutory provision, there is a division of
authority regarding whether a jury should be informed of the effect of
its answers. Two of the most outspoken critics of informing the jury
are the comparative negligence commentators, Heft and Heft, who
advance the argument that:
The jury does not know the legal effect and result of its answers to
the interrogatories in the special verdict to allow the jury to make
a fair and impartial decision on the negligence of each party.
By using the procedure of a special verdict under comparative
negligence, a jury finds the facts without regard to the ultimate
outcome of the case. The court then takes the facts as found by the
jury and awards judgment. This procedure is intended to ascertain
the truth untainted by prejudice or a desire to see one of the par-
ties win or lose. 227
Wisconsin has long held it reversible error to inform the jury of the
consequences of its findings. 228  The rationale of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin is that the jury should make findings of fact and not
decide who will win or lose the lawsuit. 2 29 Other commentators
support informing the jury on the ground that it borders on deceit
not to have the jury understand the effect of its answers. 23 0
Much of the resolution of this matter in Pennsylvania depends
upon the kind of special verdict procedure eventually adopted by our
supreme court. If the Wisconsin system of allowing the jury to de-
termine only the total damages and percentages of causal negligence
is implemented, it seems appropriate that the Pennsylvania courts
follow the Wisconsin rule prohibiting the jury from knowing the net
result of its specific answers. Moreover, the authors have difficulty
understanding the opposing argument that it is necessary for the jury
224. N.H. R v. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1977).
225. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973).
226. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975).
227. C.R. HEFT & C.J. HEFT, supra note 194, § 8.10, at 1.
228. See Erb v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Co., 20 Wis. 2d 530, 123 N.W.2d 493 (1963).
229. See id. at 536, 123 N.W.2d at 496.
230. See Thode, supra note 217, at 145.
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to understand the impact of its findings. Arguably, in a jurisdiction
which has adopted the "not as great as" or "less than" approach to
recovery, this rationale could be supported since the jury may not
realize that it is completely denying recovery when it apportions neg-
ligence equally between the parties. In situations where, as in
Pennsylvania, a 50-50 assessment of negligence still permits- recovery,
there appears to be, however, no valid reason to inform the jury and
take an unnecessary chance of importing bias into the apportionment
system. It seems inappropriate to provide elaborate procedures for
eliciting specific facts from the jury, only to gamble on injecting bias
and prejudice into the procedure by providing the jury information it
needs to make one party win the lawsuit. If jury members are finders
of fact, let them determine only the facts and let the court render the
verdict.
VI. CONCLUSION
As previously stated, the effect of the Act cannot be underesti-
mated. The Act itself has drastically altered the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence, and it is submitted that other judicially created doc-
trines which mitigated the harshness of contributory negligence will
be eliminated or severely curtailed. Although the rulings of other
courts may be helpful in interpreting the Act, it is ultimately the task
of the Pennsylvania courts' to implement and shape the concept of
comparative negligence in Pennsylvania.
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